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  INTRODUCTION   
Anthony Amsterdam’s article, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment1 is one of the best, if not the best, law review arti-
cle written on the Fourth Amendment. Thus, Minnesota Law 
Review on its hundredth anniversary fittingly recognizes and 
honors Professor Amsterdam’s article in its Symposium edition, 
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Celebrating 100 Volumes 
of the Minnesota Law Review.2 I am flattered that the Law Re-
view invited me to participate in this Symposium. 
Like his mentor and former boss, Justice Felix Frankfur-
ter, Anthony Amsterdam is a self-described “fourth amendment 
buff.”3 Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment is probably the 
 
 † Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Thanks to Wayne 
LaFave and Lauryn Gouldin for their comments and insights after reading a 
draft of this Article. Also, thanks to Kaileigh Callender and Chris Daley for 
their assistance in the preparation of this Article. Copyright © 2016 by Tracey 
Maclin.  
 1. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974). 
 2. 100 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1729–2166 (2016). 
 3. Amsterdam, supra note 1. Justice Frankfurter’s devotion to the 
Fourth Amendment was legendary. According to one scholar, “Frankfurter al-
ways considered himself something of an expert on the Fourth Amendment.” 
MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVID-
UAL LIBERTIES 157 (1991). In 1947, Justice Frankfurter told his colleagues 
that he was obsessed with the Fourth Amendment: “I am nuts about it be-
cause there is [no] provision of the Constitution more important to be nuts 
about . . . . [There is n]othing more important in [the] Bill of [R]ights than 
search and seizure.” Frank Murphy, Conference Notes on Harris v. United 
States (1947) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, 
Frank Murphy Papers, Reel 135). Ten years later, in a letter to Chief Justice 
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most famous of Professor Amsterdam’s contributions to the de-
velopment of American constitutional criminal procedure. But 
Professor Amsterdam has been involved with (and influenced) 
many of the Supreme Court’s landmark criminal procedure and 
constitutional law cases.4 For example, Professor Amsterdam’s 
 
Earl Warren, Frankfurter confessed his devotion to the Fourth Amendment 
when he wrote: “To the extent that I am charged, not by you, with being ‘a nut’ 
on the subject of the ‘knock at the door,’ I am ready to plead guilty.” Letter 
from Justice Frankfurter to Chief Justice Warren 3 (Apr. 19, 1957) (on file 
with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Felix Frankfurter Papers, 
Box 92). 
 4. Professor Anthony Amsterdam co-authored the briefs in and argued 
the three most important death penalty cases of the 1970s. See, e.g., Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (ruling that Georgia’s new death penalty law, 
which provided for bifurcated proceedings (a “guilt-determination phase” and 
a “sentencing phase”) and guided the discretion of the sentencing jury during 
the sentencing-phase proceeding, was constitutional; Professor Amsterdam co-
authored the petitioner’s brief and argued on behalf of Gregg); Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (ruling that, as applied in Georgia, the death 
penalty violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment; Professor Amsterdam co-authored the petitioner’s brief and argued 
on behalf of Furman). Professor Amsterdam was also the co-author of the 
briefs in Gregg’s companion cases: Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 
(1976); and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). Finally, Professor Amster-
dam co-authored the petitioner’s brief and argued Lockett v. Ohio, in which a 
plurality concluded that “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require 
that the sentencer [in a death penalty case] not be precluded from considering, 
as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any 
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death.” 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (Burger, C.J.) (footnotes 
omitted). 
Professor Amsterdam’s article, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960), has been cited by the Supreme 
Court in seventeen cases: Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 970 (1983) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Es-
tates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 n.14 (1982); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, 
Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 290 n.12 (1982); Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 
U.S. 308, 315 n.12 (1980); Sewell v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 982, 986 (1978) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 622 (1976); 
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 n.7 (1974); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 
775 n.5 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 
U.S. 49, 91–92 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Papachristou v. City of Jack-
sonville, 405 U.S. 156, 166 n.8 (1972); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 78 
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dal-
las, 390 U.S. 676, 685 n.11 (1968); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 257 (1967); 
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 n.5 (1965); Dombrowski 
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 501 n.4 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Cox v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 559, 568 (1965); and Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 
(1965).  
Another of Professor Amsterdam’s articles, Search, Seizure, and Section 
2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 378 (1964), has been cited by the Su-
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intelligence and insight into the Court’s thinking was evident 
in the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) amicus brief he 
co-authored in Miranda v. Arizona.5 Although the Court did not 
embrace the brief’s argument that providing counsel to all ar-
restees was the only way to adequately and effectively protect 
an arrestee’s Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination in the police station,6 the brief’s impact was 
apparent in the resulting opinion in Miranda.7 As Professor 
Yale Kamisar explained,  
[t]he failure of the [Miranda] Court to deal explicitly with (if only to 
reject) the ACLU contention is surprising, for in all other respects the 
ACLU amicus brief presents “a conceptual, legal and structural for-
mulation that is practically identical to the majority opinion—even as 
to use of language in various passages of the opinion.”8 
Two years later, Professor Amsterdam co-authored, with 
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the ACLU, an amicus 
brief in Terry v. Ohio.9 That brief urged the Court to adhere to 
probable cause as the legal standard for deciding the constitu-
 
preme Court on eight occasions: Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 396 
n.3 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 829 
n.23 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 487 n.24 
(1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 n.29 (1976); Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262 n.16 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Williams v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 305 
n.1 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); and Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 
217, 241 n.8 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).  
Lastly, Professor Amsterdam’s article, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting 
Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Ju-
risdiction To Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1965), has been 
cited by the Court in three cases: Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 106 n.8 
(1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Georgia v. Rachel, 348 U.S. 780, 786 n.4 
(1966); and City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 852 (1966) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting).  
 5. See Brief of the ACLU as Amicus Curiae, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759), 1966 WL 100516.  
 6. Id. at 3.  
 7. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Years later, scholars 
have advocated for the remedy urged by the ACLU brief. See, e.g., Charles J. 
Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal To Mirandize 
Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1830 (1987) (“I would propose . . . a per se 
rule prohibiting law enforcement authorities from interrogating a suspect in 
custody who has not consulted with an attorney.”). 
 8. Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments 
on the “New” Fifth Amendment and the Old “Voluntariness” Test, 65 MICH. L. 
REV. 59, 68, n.47 (1966) (quoting Samuel Dash, Foreword to RICHARD J. 
MEDALIE, FROM ESCOBEDO TO MIRANDA: THE ANATOMY OF A SUPREME COURT 
DECISION, at xvii (1966)). 
 9. Brief for NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae, 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67), 1967 WL 113672. 
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tionality of police seizures and searches of persons falling short 
of a custodial arrest and search incident to arrest.10 If the prob-
able cause test were abandoned, the brief argued that police 
stop and frisk techniques would become a tool of police oppres-
sion.11 Terry, of course, did abandon the probable cause stand-
ard and ruled that police may frisk a person if they reasonably 
suspect the person is armed and dangerous.12 The brief’s predic-
tion that Court approval of stop and frisk practices would gen-
erate hostility within black communities and diminish the 
Fourth Amendment rights of black citizens was prescient.13 
 
 10. Id. at 68. 
 11. Id. at 34 (“[B]oth the ‘balancing’ theory of Fourth Amendment rights 
and the Stop-Frisk Model that is built upon it show themselves to be mere fi-
ne, scholastic pretexts for oppression. . . . [T]he ‘balance’ scale which they pur-
port to employ is invariably tipped by the police commissioner’s thumb; and 
their consequence is nothing more or less than a police dictatorship of the 
streets.”).  
 12. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
 13. In 1974, Professor Amsterdam observed: “The pressures upon police-
men to use the stop-and-frisk power as a device for exploratory evidence 
searches in [urban areas] are intense. Police can justify virtually any exercise 
of the power because these are ‘high-crime’ areas where all young males, at 
least, are suspect.” Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 438 (footnotes omitted). Al-
most forty years later, a federal judge found that the New York City Police 
Department’s (NYPD) stop and frisk practices violated the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights of black and Hispanic individuals. See Floyd v. City 
of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The federal court in Floyd 
also commented on the resentment generated by the NYPD’s stop and frisk 
policy. Id. at 556–57 (“The New York City Police Department (‘NYPD’) made 
4.4 million stops between January 2004 and June 2012. Over 80% of these 4.4 
million stops were of blacks or Hispanics. . . . Those who are routinely subject-
ed to stops are overwhelmingly people of color, and they are justifiably trou-
bled to be singled out when many of them have done nothing to attract the 
unwanted attention. Some plaintiffs testified that stops make them feel un-
welcome in some parts of the City, and distrustful of the police.”). 
Fourteen years prior to the Floyd ruling, the New York Attorney General 
issued a report, based on NYPD’s records, regarding the effects of the NYPD’s 
stop and frisk practices. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE STATE OF 
N.Y., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP & FRISK” PRACTICES: 
A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 94–95 (1999) (“[B]lacks 
comprised 25.6% of the City’s population, yet 50.6% of all persons ‘stopped’ 
were black. Hispanics comprised 23.7% of the City’s population yet, 33.0% of 
all ‘stops’ were of Hispanics. By contrast, whites comprised 43.4% of the City’s 
population, but accounted for only 12.9% of all ‘stops.’ Thus, blacks were over 
six times more likely to be ‘stopped’ than whites in New York City, while His-
panics were over four times more likely to be ‘stopped’ than whites in New 
York City.” (footnotes omitted)). The report later notes that “crime rates do not 
fully explain the higher rate at which minorities are ‘stopped’ by the NYPD.” 
Id. at 119. Tellingly, the Attorney General’s office found that the NYPD’s utili-
zation of stop and frisk tactics “in minority neighborhoods was identified as a 
particular flash point in the matrix of police-community relations.” Id. at 8.  
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Though it was published in 1974, the themes analyzed in 
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment remain relevant to 
many of the Fourth Amendment issues decided by judges to-
day. In a smooth, but elegant style,14 Professor Amsterdam dis-
cussed myriad search and seizure topics, including, why the 
Fourth Amendment is essential to a free society; the text and 
history of the amendment; whether the Framers’ understand-
ing of the amendment should control or influence modern 
search and seizure rulings; the Supreme Court’s mindset when 
interpreting the applicability and scope of the amendment; the 
problems associated with the so-called “exclusionary rule,” 
which suppresses evidence illegally obtained by the police; why 
the exclusionary rule is necessary; and why “police discretion to 
conduct search and seizure activity [should] be tolerably con-
fined by either legislation or police-made rules and regulations, 
subject to judicial review for reasonableness.”15 
I will focus on a few themes raised by Amsterdam that 
have resonated with me since I first read his article thirty 
years ago. (I have re-read his article several times in my thirty 
years as a law professor.) After listing those themes, I will dis-
cuss why those themes are relevant to an area of Fourth 
Amendment law that affects millions of Americans and has 
 
Others have documented and described the tension produced by stop and 
frisk practices. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, The Police Bullies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 
1997, at A35 (“The stories are endless. If you go into a predominately black or 
Latino neighborhood all you have to do is talk to young people at random. 
They will tell you how they are stopped, frisked, searched, threatened with ar-
rest if they don’t produce identification, cursed at, slapped around, spread-
eagled on the ground, thrown against walls, run off of street-corners, threat-
ened with weapons. Inevitably some are falsely arrested. Some are brutal-
ized.”); see also David Kocieniewski, Success of Elite Police Unit Exacts a Toll 
on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at B5 (“‘There are [officers] who are 
willing to toss anyone who’s walking with his hands in his pockets,’ said an 
[NYPD] officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. ‘We frisk 20, maybe 
30 people a day. Are they all by the book? Of course not; it’s safer and easier to 
just toss people. And if it’s the 25th of the month and you haven’t got your gun 
yet? Things can get a little desperate.’”); Elizabeth Kolbert, The Perils of Safe-
ty, NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 1999, at 50, 51 (describing that the NYPD’s empha-
sis on getting guns off the streets “put the cops in an ambiguous relationship 
with the people they were supposed to be protecting: virtually everyone be-
came a potential suspect”). For a historical account of the NYPD’s stop and 
frisk practices from the 1990s to the present, see Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse 
Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of New York City 
“Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495 (2014).  
 14. Amsterdam’s article was the basis of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lec-
tures, delivered at the University of Minnesota Law School on January 22–24, 
1974. 
 15. Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 409. 
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been the subject of a recent Supreme Court ruling, namely, 
traffic stops. 
Early in his article, Professor Amsterdam cautions his 
readers that he will not be proposing “any single, comprehen-
sive theory of the fourth amendment.”16 Rather, he intends to 
“identify and to discuss a number of basic issues that compli-
cate the development of a single, comprehensive fourth 
amendment theory.”17 Similarly, while he devotes considerable 
space to discussing the history of the Fourth Amendment, Am-
sterdam does not rely solely on the Framers’ vision of the 
amendment to explain its meaning for today’s world. He ex-
plains that there are two ways of understanding the amend-
ment: it could be “viewed as a restriction upon only particular 
methods of law enforcement or as a restriction upon law en-
forcement practices generally.”18 Later, he concludes history 
should not control the amendment’s meaning. “[H]istory is a 
standoff: there is certainly nothing in it to suggest, let alone re-
quire, a narrow or a static view of the fourth amendment’s 
broad language.”19 Moreover, Amsterdam recognized that even 
if we wanted to “take exclusive counsel of the framers” on the 
Fourth Amendment’s meaning for our times,20 advancing tech-
nology and science provide law enforcement officials the ability 
to search and seize in ways unimaginable to the Framers. Alt-
hough his example seems quaint in an era when cell phones act 
like computers21 and GPS tracking is capable of constantly 
monitoring an individual’s whereabouts,22 Amsterdam puts it 
nicely when he observes: “Miniscule microphones are not the 
only wonder of our lives that the framers did not know.”23  
Because Professor Amsterdam insisted he was not propos-
ing “any single, comprehensive theory of the fourth amend-
 
 16. Id. at 352. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 361–62. 
 19. Id. at 401. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (“The term ‘cell 
phone’ is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact mini-
computers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone.”). 
 22. See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (per curiam) 
(holding that requiring a sex-offender to wear a satellite-based monitoring de-
vice at all times constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, reasoning 
that the state “program is plainly designed to obtain information. And since it 
does so by physically intruding on a subject’s body, it effects a Fourth Amend-
ment search”). 
 23. Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 401. 
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ment,”24 I assume that he might worry if his article prompted 
someone to propose a general theory of the Fourth Amendment. 
Yet, that is just the impact his article has had on my view of 
the Fourth Amendment. Twenty years ago, I wrote that the 
“central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police 
power and discretion.”25 My view of the amendment was in-
spired, in part, by several passages in Amsterdam’s article. For 
example, he asserts that “[t]he Bill of Rights in general and the 
fourth amendment in particular are profoundly anti-
government documents.”26 Acknowledging that “‘[p]olicing the 
police’”27 is an endeavor that “most judges would prefer to 
avoid,” and a task that some judges view as none their busi-
ness,28 Amsterdam nonetheless observes: “[r]ecognition that the 
fourth amendment is quintessentially a regulation of the po-
lice—that, in enforcing the fourth amendment, courts must po-
lice the police—serves to counteract that sense” that judges 
should defer to police authority.29 Finally, Amsterdam opines, 
echoing Justice Frankfurter, that there are “few constitutional 
issues more important than defining the reach of the fourth 
amendment—the extent to which it controls the array of activi-
ties of the police.”30  
Professor Amsterdam also helped introduce to me the im-
portance and relevance of the Fourth Amendment’s history. A 
former law clerk for Justice Frankfurter, Amsterdam describes 
Frankfurter as one “who more than any other of the Justices 
sought the fourth amendment’s meaning in its history.”31 Alt-
hough he is no proponent of originalism as a theory for deciding 
constitutional issues,32 Amsterdam’s article helped me realize 
 
 24. Id. at 352. 
 25. Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 201 (1993). 
 26. Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 353. 
 27. Id. at 370 (citing Fred E. Inbau, The Social and Ethical Requirements 
of Criminal Prosecution, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 209, 212 
(1961)). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 371. 
 30. Id. at 377. 
 31. Id. at 397. 
 32. See id. at 362 (“[T]he Constitution ‘states or ought to state not rules 
for the passing hour, but principles for an expanding future . . . .’” (quoting 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 83 (1921))); 
id. at 416 (“The police in this country are no longer ragged bands of volunteers 
bearing flintlocks, and there is no reason to deal with today’s police problems 
with a flintlock Constitution.”). 
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that studying the history of the amendment—not the type of 
historical focus that asks whether the Framers condemned or 
approved specific types of governmental searches or seizures, 
but a focus on history that seeks to understand the Framers’ 
general vision of the amendment—is valuable to our under-
standing of the Fourth Amendment today. Professor Amster-
dam is not an academic theorist out of touch with the real 
world views of judges and politicians; he recognizes that the 
Framers were not solely concerned with protecting the rights of 
criminals. But he also understands, paraphrasing Vince Lom-
bardi, “that, while winning isn’t everything, losing is nothing.”33 
According to Amsterdam, “[t]he revolutionary statesmen were 
plainly and deeply concerned with losing liberty. That is what 
the Bill of Rights is all about.”34 One quote from Amsterdam il-
lustrates how awareness of the Framers’ experience with arbi-
trary search and seizure practices can affect how judges inter-
pret the amendment today: “[T]he authors of the Bill of Rights 
had known oppressive government. I believe they meant to 
erect every safeguard against it. I believe they meant to guar-
antee to their survivors the right to live as free from every in-
terference of government agents as our condition would per-
mit.”35 
In the pages that follow, I will connect two perspectives 
from Amsterdam’s article—the Fourth Amendment’s concern 
with discretionary police power and the Framers’ vision of the 
Fourth Amendment to bar arbitrary and ruleless searches and 
seizures36—to an aspect of modern American society that affects 
millions of people: traffic stops by the police.37 This past Term, 
 
 33. Id. at 400. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 417 (“A paramount purpose of the fourth amendment is to pro-
hibit arbitrary searches and seizures as well as unjustified searches and sei-
zures. . . . Arbitrary searches and seizures are ‘unreasonable’ searches and sei-
zures; ruleless searches and seizures practiced at the varying and unguided 
discretion of thousands of individual peace officers are arbitrary searches and 
seizures; therefore, ruleless searches and seizures are ‘unreasonable’ searches 
and seizures.” (footnote omitted)). 
 37. Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the 
End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 874 (2001) (“Every 
day, millions of cars are stopped for one of the myriad of [sic] regulations gov-
erning our use of public streets. As soon as you get into your car, even before 
you turn the ignition key, you have subjected yourself to intense police scruti-
ny. So dense is the modern web of motor vehicle regulations that every motor-
ist is likely to get caught in it every time he drives to the grocery store. . . . It 
is by the good graces, or the inattention, of a police officer that you escape a 
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the Supreme Court decided Rodriguez v. United States.38 At is-
sue was whether the Fourth Amendment “tolerates a dog sniff 
conducted after completion of a traffic stop.”39 The Court, in a 
6–3 ruling, held that “a police stop exceeding the time needed 
to handle the matter for which the stop was made” violates the 
Fourth Amendment.40 While certainly a temporary victory for 
Mr. Rodriguez,41 I submit that Rodriguez is a vexing decision on 
several fronts. As I will explain below, Rodriguez is a signifi-
cant ruling because it rejects the argument that police can pro-
long a traffic stop to pursue a drug investigation. At the same 
time, however, Rodriguez blesses two troublesome investigative 
techniques that have been utilized in the country’s seemingly 
never-ending “War on Drugs” and that are, in my view, incon-
sistent with Fourth Amendment freedoms and contrary to Pro-
fessor Amsterdam’s insights on the amendment.  
 
traffic stop and a ticket, or worse.”).  
 38. 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). 
 39. Id. at 1612. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Although the Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision affirming 
Rodriguez’s conviction, the Court remanded the case to the appellate court to 
determine “whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justified detain-
ing Rodriguez beyond completion of the traffic infraction investigation.” Id. at 
1616–17. There is no doubt in my mind that the appellate court—urged on by 
Justice Thomas’s dissent, see id. at 1622–23 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (conclud-
ing that although the appellate court did not address the issue, the officer’s 
detection of an air freshener, the passenger’s nervousness, and the officer’s 
skepticism about the reasons for Rodriguez’s travels, provided reasonable sus-
picion of criminal activity)—will ultimately find on remand that there was 
reasonable suspicion to detain Rodriguez. 
Furthermore, on remand, the prosecution will undoubtedly argue that the 
drugs discovered as a result of the illegal seizure are admissible under the 
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Prior to the Court’s ruling in Ro-
driguez, the Eighth Circuit routinely upheld extending a traffic stop to permit 
a dog sniff, provided the extension of the stop was de minimis. See, e.g., United 
States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d. 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2014) (“A brief delay to em-
ploy a dog does not unreasonably prolong the stop . . . and we have repeatedly 
upheld dog sniffs that were conducted minutes after the traffic stop conclud-
ed.”); see also United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(upholding a four-minute delay as a de minimis intrusion); United States v. 
Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1002–03 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding a two-minute delay); 
United States v. Morgan, 270 F.3d 625, 632 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding a delay 
of “well under ten minutes”). On remand, the prosecutor will certainly argue 
that under Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (holding the exclu-
sionary rule doesn’t apply to a police search in reasonable reliance on binding 
judicial precedent), the evidence unlawfully acquired from Rodriguez’s trunk 
is admissible because the police were relying upon binding judicial precedent 
that was subsequently overruled. 
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Imagine you are driving on an interstate highway or coun-
try road ten miles-per-hour faster than the posted speed limit. 
Or, you fail to stay in the right lane while driving on an empty 
interstate highway, or temporarily veer onto the shoulder of the 
road while changing the station on your car radio. Or, unbe-
knownst to you, your vehicle has a broken taillight. The next 
thing you know, the blue lights of a police cruiser appear in 
your rear-view mirror. The officer approaches your vehicle and 
begins a routine that occurs on countless occasions every day.  
After obtaining your driver’s license, vehicle registration, 
and proof of insurance, the officer asks you to accompany him 
to the patrol car. You comply without asking why you are being 
moved from your vehicle. While inside the police cruiser, the of-
ficer contacts a police dispatcher or uses his computer to run a 
check on your documents. He may also check whether there are 
outstanding warrants for your arrest, or request a criminal his-
tory report on you. While these checks are proceeding, a re-
markable phenomenon occurs. The officer begins asking “itin-
erary” or “context-framing” questions.42 Where are you coming 
from? How long were you there? Where are you going? How 
long do you plan on staying at your destination? Who will you 
visit? How long have you known that person? Where does she 
work? Has she ever been arrested for drug trafficking?  
At some point, you realize that what began as an ordinary 
traffic stop has morphed into a criminal investigation and you 
are the target. Surely, you think, this questioning violates your 
rights. After all, you were stopped for speeding, or momentarily 
 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 684 F.3d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 2012), 
(“Once in the patrol car, Trooper Rutledge began to ask Riley questions about 
his travel itinerary.”); United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 510 (4th Cir. 
2011) (“[The officer] asked Digiovanni numerous questions concerning his 
travel history and travel plans, only a few of which possibly related to the jus-
tification for the stop.”); United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 494 (6th Cir. 
2010) (stating that asking “context-framing questions will rarely suggest a 
lack of diligence” on the part of a detaining officer); United States v. Olivera-
Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 2007) (“When police stop a motorist for a 
traffic violation, an officer may detain the occupants of the vehicle while the 
officer ‘completes a number of routine but somewhat time-consuming tasks 
related to the traffic violation.’ . . . While the officer performs these tasks, he 
may ask the occupants routine questions, such as the destination and purpose 
of the trip . . . .” (citation omitted)); United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221 
(10th Cir. 2001) (“Travel plans typically are related to the purpose of a traffic 
stop because the motorist is traveling at the time of the stop. For example, a 
motorist’s travel history and travel plans may help explain, or put into con-
text, why the motorist was weaving (if tired) or speeding (if there was an ur-
gency to the travel).”). 
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veering onto the shoulder, or a broken taillight. While verifying 
your driver documents is a valid task aimed at determining if 
you are properly licensed and that your vehicle is entitled to be 
on the road,43 what is the justification for the questioning? 
What do these questions have to do with a broken taillight? The 
questioning has absolutely nothing to do with the traffic infrac-
tion, which was the only basis for the stop. 
It may surprise some, but the Supreme Court, the institu-
tion in charge of “policing the police”44 and upholding our 
Fourth Amendment rights under our constitutional democracy, 
without ever directly addressing the issue, has approved this 
type of police questioning. Indeed, in its most recent ruling on 
the powers of police during routine traffic stops, Rodriguez v. 
United States, the Court explained that the Fourth Amendment 
tolerates certain unrelated investigations that do not lengthen 
a roadside detention.45 Rodriguez’s endorsement of police ques-
tioning was unnecessary and regrettable. It was gratuitous be-
cause the issue before the Court—whether police can detain a 
motorist to use a drug-sniffing canine after the completion of a 
traffic stop—had nothing to do with unrelated questioning dur-
ing a traffic stop. The Court’s comments were lamentable for 
two reasons. First, the practice of questioning motorists about 
matters unrelated to the traffic stop is inconsistent with the 
same legal framework the Court relied upon to invalidate the 
detention and dog sniff at issue in Rodriguez. Second, there 
was no reason for the Court to provide its imprimatur on a 
criminal investigative technique that police regularly use to ar-
bitrarily interrogate motorists during routine traffic stops. 
On a deeper level, Rodriguez’s dicta about police question-
ing during traffic stops is disappointing for its failure to appre-
ciate the fundamental value of the Fourth Amendment. As Pro-
fessor Amsterdam has taught us, “the fourth amendment is 
quintessentially a regulation of the police—that, in enforcing 
the fourth amendment, courts must police the police.”46 More 
specifically, Professor Amsterdam’s article teaches that control-
 
 43. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658–59 (1979) (“[T]he States have a 
vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to 
operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence 
that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being ob-
served.”).  
 44. Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 370 (quoting Inbau, supra note 27). 
 45. 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (“An officer, in other words, may conduct 
certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop.”). 
 46. Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 371. 
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ling the discretionary power of officers while they are effectuat-
ing searches and seizures is essential to protecting Fourth 
Amendment freedoms.47 Police seize millions of Americans eve-
ry year during traffic stops.48 Traffic stops are rife with the po-
tential for arbitrary and discriminatory police power.49 “Once 
an officer stops a motorist for a traffic offense, the officer has 
discretion to transform that traffic stop into an investigation of 
other serious crimes without the check of reasonable suspicion 
or probable cause . . . .”50 If the Justices want to protect the 
Fourth Amendment rights of millions of American motorists, 
they should recognize that police interrogation of motorists 
about subjects unrelated to the reason for the traffic stop pro-
vides police with unchecked discretion to pursue a criminal in-
vestigation and is beyond the scope of an ordinary traffic stop.  
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I explains the re-
sult and legal reasoning of Rodriguez. It also explains the legal 
standard, first announced in 1968, that courts have traditional-
ly used to judge the constitutionality of police conduct during 
investigative detentions, which includes traffic stops. Part II 
 
 47. Id. at 415 (“The pervasiveness and discontrol of police discretion is 
everywhere acknowledged: policemen make hundreds of thousands of deci-
sions daily that ‘can affect in some way someone’s dignity, or self-respect, or 
sense of privacy, or constitutional rights . . . .’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 48. According to a report issued by the U.S. Department of Justice, in 
2011, “[a]bout 10% of the 212.3 million U.S. drivers age 16 or older were 
stopped while operating a motor vehicle during their most recent contact with 
police.” LYNN LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 
242937, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011, at 3 
(2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf.  
 49. Cf. David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Of-
fenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 544, 545 (1997) (“[State traffic] codes regulate the details of 
driving in ways both big and small, obvious and arcane. In the most literal 
sense, no driver can avoid violating some traffic law during a short drive, even 
with the most careful attention. Fairly read, Whren says that any traffic viola-
tion can support a stop, no matter what the real reason for it is; this makes 
any citizen fair game for a stop, almost any time, anywhere, virtually at the 
whim of police.” (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (ruling 
that police motives are constitutionally irrelevant in determining the validity 
of a traffic stop))); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and 
the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 273 (“Since vir-
tually everyone violates traffic laws at least occasionally, the upshot of [four 
rulings decided in the 1997 Term] is that police officers, if they are patient, 
can eventually pull over anyone they choose, order the driver and all passen-
gers out of the car, and then ask for permission to search the vehicle without 
first making clear the detention is over.”).  
 50. Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”: Driving Without the Fourth Amend-
ment, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2013). 
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discusses recent rulings of the Court that have been read to au-
thorize police to pursue criminal investigative practices—such 
as dog sniffs and interrogation unrelated to the reason for the 
stop—during ordinary traffic stops, provided those practices do 
not prolong the traffic stop. Part II also explains why those rul-
ings—Illinois v. Caballes,51 Muehler v. Mena,52 and Arizona v. 
Johnson53—have been misread and misapplied to allow arbi-
trary police interrogation during routine traffic stops. 
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND: RODRIGUEZ V. UNITED 
STATES AND TERRY STOPS   
The facts in Rodriguez were straightforward. Rodriguez 
and a passenger were driving after midnight when their vehicle 
veered onto the shoulder of a Nebraska state highway “for one 
or two seconds and then jerk[ed] back onto the road.”54 A K-9 
police officer, Morgan Struble, stopped the vehicle. Struble ob-
tained Rodriguez’s driving documents and asked Rodriguez to 
accompany him to the police cruiser.55 Rodriguez asked if he 
was required to do so, Struble said no, so Rodriguez waited in 
his vehicle. After checking Rodriguez’s documents, Struble re-
turned to Rodriguez’s vehicle, asked the passenger for his driv-
er’s license, and “began to question him about where the two 
men were coming from and where they were going.”56 Struble 
then checked the passenger’s record and called for a second of-
ficer. Struble began writing a warning ticket for Rodriguez.57 
After Struble issued a warning and returned to Rodriguez 
and his passenger their documents, the tasks associated with 
the traffic stop were completed. Rodriguez should have been 
free to depart the scene. Struble, however, did not consider Ro-
driguez free to leave, nor allow him to leave. Instead, he asked 
permission to walk his drug-sniffing dog around Rodriguez’s 
vehicle.58 When Rodriguez denied permission, Struble ordered 
him “to turn off the ignition, exit the vehicle, and stand in front 
of the patrol car to wait for the second officer.”59 After the se-
 
 51. 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
 52. 544 U.S. 93 (2005). 
 53. 555 U.S. 323 (2009). 
 54. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015).  
 55. Id. at 1613. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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cond officer arrived, Struble retrieved his dog and twice walked 
him around Rodriguez’s vehicle. The dog alerted to the pres-
ence of drugs. A search of the vehicle disclosed methampheta-
mine. “All told, seven or eight minutes had elapsed from the 
time Struble issued the written warning until the dog indicated 
the presence of drugs.”60 
After Rodriguez was charged with possession with intent to 
distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, he moved 
to suppress the drugs found in his vehicle. The lower federal 
courts denied the motion.61 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit concluded that the seven or eight minute delay between 
when the traffic stop should have ended and the dog’s alert to 
the presence of drugs was a “de minimis intrusion on Rodri-
guez’s personal liberty,” and thus reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.62  
Like several of the Court’s recent traffic stop cases, Rodri-
guez presented a narrow issue: “whether the Fourth Amend-
ment tolerates a dog sniff conducted after completion of a traf-
fic stop.”63 The majority opinion written by Justice Ginsburg 
held that “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the 
matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s 
shield against unreasonable seizures.”64 Reaffirming that a traf-
fic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to 
a formal arrest,”65 Justice Ginsburg explained that “the tolera-
ble duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is de-
termined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic viola-
tion that warranted the stop, and attend to related safety 
concerns.”66 In what seems intended as a quasi-brightline or per 
se rule to assess future cases, Justice Ginsburg wrote: “Author-
ity for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic in-
fraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.”67 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 63. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1614 (citations omitted). 
 66. Id. (citations omitted). 
 67. Id. Professor Orin Kerr describes this statement as “[t]he most im-
portant sentence in the opinion.” Orin Kerr, Police Can’t Delay Traffic Stops 
To Investigate Crimes Absent Suspicion, Supreme Court Rules, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/ 
2015/04/21/police-cant-delay-traffic-stops-to-investigate-crimes-absent 
-suspicion-supreme-court-rules. 
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When this standard is applied to the facts in Rodriguez, it 
is plain that Officer Struble’s continued seizure of Rodriguez 
was unreasonable. Once Officer Struble issued the warning 
ticket and returned the motorists’ documents, the “tasks tied to 
the traffic infraction [were] completed.”68 The authority for the 
traffic stop had elapsed and Rodriguez should have been free to 
leave. Instead, Struble prolonged the stop, first by asking 
whether Rodriguez would consent to walking the dog around 
his vehicle, and then when Rodriguez refused, by ordering Ro-
driguez out of his vehicle to await the arrival of the second of-
ficer. Unless there was some individualized suspicion for this 
continued detention, detaining Rodriguez to allow a dog sniff 
constituted an unreasonable seizure. 
Justice Ginsburg rejected the argument that continuing 
the stop to allow a dog sniff for narcotics was reasonable be-
cause it was a de minimis amount of time—seven or eight 
minutes—and promoted the government’s interest in detecting 
illegal narcotics. Acknowledging that Pennsylvania v. Mimms69 
had embraced a similar de minimis rationale when it upheld an 
officer’s authority to order a driver out of his vehicle during an 
ordinary traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of danger, 
Justice Ginsburg explained that the exit order approved in 
Mimms promoted officer safety and was tied to completing the 
mission of the traffic stop.70 By contrast, detaining a motorist—
even for a minimal amount of time—to allow a dog sniff is done 
to detect criminality. Moreover, a dog sniff is not “an ordinary 
incident of a traffic stop”; it lacks a “close connection to road-
way safety”71 in the same way that an exit order promotes of-
ficer safety. Thus, a dog sniff for narcotics “is not fairly charac-
terized as part of the officer’s traffic mission.”72 
Nor was the majority persuaded by the government’s con-
tention that an officer may prolong a stop to perform a dog sniff 
provided “the officer is reasonably diligent in pursuing the traf-
fic-related purpose of the stop, and the overall duration of the 
stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other 
 
 68. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. 
 69. 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam). 
 70. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1611 (“The Court reasoned in Mimms that the 
government’s ‘legitimate and weighty’ interest in officer safety outweighs the 
‘de minimis’ additional intrusion of requiring a driver, lawfully stopped, to exit 
a vehicle.”). 
 71. Id. at 1615. 
 72. Id.  
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traffic stops involving similar circumstances.”73 In other words, 
the government argued that officers who are especially efficient 
in completing the tasks related to the traffic stop can earn “bo-
nus time” to conduct unrelated criminal investigations.74 Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s response to this argument was direct and sim-
ple: the reasonableness of a seizure “depends on what the police 
in fact do.”75 Here, Officer Struble completed the tasks of the 
traffic stop when he issued the warning. Because the dog sniff 
prolonged the stop beyond that point, it was unreasonable. To 
leave no doubt that the rule announced by the majority did not 
turn on when an officer chose to sequence a dog sniff, Justice 
Ginsburg added: “The critical question, then, is not whether the 
dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, as [the 
dissent] supposes, but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—
i.e., adds time to—‘the stop.’”76 
Rodriguez’s holding that police may not extend—even tem-
porarily—a completed traffic stop to perform a dog sniff for 
narcotics is important because it rejects the reasoning of many 
lower courts which had allowed police, without individualized 
suspicion, to extend traffic stops for criminal investigative pur-
poses.  
Rodriguez, however, does not create new law or announce 
an innovation in the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine. Ra-
ther, Rodriguez’s holding is based on legal norms nearly forty 
years old. Indeed, although it may not have been obvious to the 
casual reader, the reasoning and result in Rodriguez closely 
tracks search and seizure doctrine for investigative detentions 
that dates back to the late 1960s.77 In fact, the logic of Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion in Rodriguez parallels the reasoning of her 
dissent in Illinois v. Caballes, where a majority of the Court 
ruled that the Fourth Amendment does not require reasonable 
suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle 
during a legitimate traffic stop.78 Dissenting in Caballes, Jus-
tice Ginsburg applied the familiar standard of review an-
nounced in Terry v. Ohio79 to find that a dog sniff had imper-
 
 73. Id. at 1616 (citing Brief for the United States at 36–39, Rodriguez, 135 
S. Ct. 1609 (No. 13-9972), 2014 WL 7205515). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (citing Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 115–17 (1998)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See infra notes 82–9797.  
 78. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).  
 79. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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missibly broadened the scope of an ordinary traffic stop into an 
unlawful drug investigation.80 But before I explain why Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Caballes was more faithful to 
the Court’s precedents than the Caballes majority opinion, I 
will describe why Rodriguez’s holding is consistent with forty 
years of Fourth Amendment rulings involving investigative de-
tentions. 
While the Court considers a routine traffic stop a seizure 
subject to Fourth Amendment restraints, it has not treated a 
traffic stop as the equivalent of an arrest even when police have 
probable cause to believe that a traffic offense has occurred.81 
Because a traffic stop is assumed to be a brief seizure by the po-
lice, the Court views a traffic stop as “more analogous to a so-
called ‘Terry stop’ than to a formal arrest.”82 Terry, which ad-
dressed whether police can frisk a person for weapons when an 
officer reasonably suspects that the person is armed and dan-
gerous, specified a two-prong standard for assessing the consti-
tutionality of police conduct not amounting to an arrest or full-
scale search of a person.83 The Court in Terry explained: “in de-
termining whether the seizure and search were ‘unreasonable’ 
our inquiry is a dual one—[first] whether the officer’s action 
was justified at its inception, and [second] whether it was rea-
sonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified 
the interference in the first place.”84 When this standard is ap-
 
 80. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 417 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Tellingly, the 
Caballes majority did not challenge or question Justice Ginsburg’s analysis on 
this point. 
 81. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), however, the 
Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment does not bar the custodial arrest of a 
person who commits a minor traffic offense.  
 82. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (citation omitted). 
While the seizures that occurred in the Court’s initial investigative seizure 
cases—Terry, 392 U.S. at 1, and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)—
were brief as a temporal matter, the typical investigative detention is a lot 
longer than the seizures upheld in those cases. Indeed, the Court has 
acknowledged that the so-called Terry stop “is not confined to the momentary, 
on-the-street detention accompanied by a frisk for weapons involved in Terry 
and Adams.” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981) (footnote omit-
ted). Further, although the overwhelming majority of traffic stops are based on 
probable cause, as Professor Wayne LaFave tells us, most lower courts have 
assumed that traffic stops can also be initiated on reasonable suspicion—a 
lower degree of evidence than probable cause. Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine 
Traffic Stop” From Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth 
Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1848 (2004). The Court has not decided 
whether this assumption is correct. See id. at 1850–52. 
 83. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20. 
 84. Id. 
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plied to traffic stops, the first prong considers whether the traf-
fic stop was validly commenced—did the police have probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the motorist? The second 
prong—the scope prong—encompasses two factors. As the 
Court’s subsequent cases have clarified, the second prong con-
siders both the length of the seizure and the manner or methods 
used by the police to effectuate the stop.85 
For example, in 1975, the Court looked to Terry’s frame-
work to decide the constitutionality of investigative detentions 
of vehicles near the border for immigration offenses. In United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Court stated that when vehicles 
are stopped for detentions, under Terry, “the stop and inquiry 
must be ‘reasonably related in scope to the justification for 
their initiation.’”86 Accordingly, a border agent may question 
the driver and his passenger “about their citizenship and im-
migration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious 
circumstances, but any further detention or search must be 
based on consent or probable cause.”87 
Brignoni-Ponce was not the only Burger Court decision to 
utilize Terry’s two-prong test to judge the validity of investiga-
tive detentions. In 1983, in a plurality opinion in Florida v. 
Royer, Justice White asserted: “an investigative detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop.”88 Furthermore, four of the Justices in 
Royer ruled that the prosecution has the burden of establishing 
that an investigative seizure was “sufficiently limited in scope 
and duration.”89 
 
 85. Cf. United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 511 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]he government’s argument fails to recognize that investigative stops must 
be limited both in scope and duration.”); LaFave, supra note 82, at 1863 (ex-
plaining that when courts have applied the Terry test to cases involving rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal wronging, rather than in cases involving ordi-
nary traffic stops, “courts have enforced both the temporal and intensity 
limits”). 
 86. 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29). 
 87. Id. at 881–82. Ultimately, the Court in Brignoni-Ponce ruled that 
stops must be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Stopping 
a vehicle solely based on the Mexican ancestry of a vehicle’s occupants was 
impermissible, but the “Mexican appearance” of an occupant is “a relevant fac-
tor” in the reasonable suspicion calculus. Id. at 887. 
 88. 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion). 
 89. Id. None of the concurring or dissenting Justices in Royer voiced objec-
tion to the plurality’s conclusion that the prosecution has the burden of estab-
lishing that an investigative seizure be sufficiently limited in scope and dura-
tion. 
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Two years later, in 1985, United States v. Sharpe clarified 
that judges should analyze investigative detentions to deter-
mine “whether the police diligently pursued a means of investi-
gation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions 
quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the de-
fendant.”90 Likewise, in United States v. Hensley the Court in-
structed that the constitutionality of an investigative detention 
is assessed by determining whether the facts “justified the 
length and intrusiveness of the stop and detention that actually 
occurred.”91  
Even the Rehnquist Court applied the Terry framework to 
evaluate the reasonableness of police procedures that begin as 
investigative detentions. In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District 
Court, the Court upheld a statute that authorized police to ar-
rest a person who refuses to identify himself during a valid 
Terry stop.92 The Court upheld the law, but only after determin-
ing that “the request for identification was ‘reasonably related 
in scope to the circumstances which justified’ the stop.”93 In-
deed, at the start of its analysis of Terry’s requirements, Hiibel 
quoted the two-prong Terry test,94 noted that an officer’s con-
duct during an investigative detention must satisfy Terry’s 
scope prong,95 and ultimately concluded that the challenged 
conduct in Hiibel satisfied Terry’s scope prong because the of-
ficer’s request for identification was related in scope to the rea-
son for the stop, and “not an effort to obtain an arrest for fail-
ure to identify after a Terry stop yielded insufficient 
evidence.”96 These rulings establish, as Justice Ginsburg noted 
in her Caballes dissent, that the second prong of the Terry 
test—the scope prong—“is not confined to the duration of the 
seizure; it also encompasses the manner in which the seizure is 
conducted.”97  
 
 90. 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (citations omitted). 
 91. 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985). 
 92. 542 U.S. 177 (2004). 
 93. Id. at 188–89 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
 94. Id. at 185 (citations omitted). 
 95. Id. at 188 (acknowledging the petitioner’s concern that the stop-and-
identify law circumvents the probable cause requirement by allowing police to 
arrest a person for being suspicious, and explaining that the petitioner’s con-
cerns “are met by the requirement that a Terry stop must be justified at its 
inception and ‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified’ 
the initial stop” (citation omitted)).  
 96. Id. at 189. 
 97. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 419 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). 
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Judged against this long line of cases, the result in Rodri-
guez was undoubtedly correct. While the facts in Rodriguez sat-
isfy the first prong of the Terry test because Officer Struble had 
probable cause to stop Rodriguez’s vehicle for a traffic offense, 
the officer’s conduct violated the second prong of Terry. Once 
Struble issued the warning, the purpose for the traffic stop 
ended. Further detaining Rodriguez to pursue a dog sniff was 
in no way “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 
which justified the interference in the first place.”98 No Court 
precedent authorizes police to extend—even for a de minimis 
period of time—a Terry stop for criminal investigative purposes 
after the legitimate purposes of the stop have been satisfied. 
Put differently, Rodriguez did not announce new or expanded 
Fourth Amendment protections.99 Rather, it simply applied a 
standard first announced in 1968, and subsequently applied by 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, to find that detaining a mo-
torist to conduct a drug investigation without reasonable suspi-
cion of criminality was an unreasonable seizure. 
II.  ARBITRARY POLICE QUESTIONING OF MOTORISTS 
DURING ROUTINE TRAFFIC STOPS VIOLATES FOURTH 
AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES   
The legal analysis described above in Part I was enough to 
resolve the only issue presented in Rodriguez. Although unnec-
essary to decide Rodriguez, Justice Ginsburg read Caballes100 
and Johnson101 to allow police to conduct “unrelated investiga-
tions” (e.g., dog sniffs and police interrogation) during routine 
traffic stops, provided such investigations do not prolong a 
 
 98. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. 
 99. The point that Rodriguez does not expand Fourth Amendment protec-
tions is not meant to downplay the importance of the ruling or criticize Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion. As noted earlier, Rodriguez’s holding is highly significant 
because it shuts down the approach, adopted by a majority of federal and state 
courts, of flouting Terry’s temporal restriction. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.3(b), at 
504 (5th ed. 2012) (“[M]ost of the lower courts that have squarely confronted 
[challenges based on Terry’s temporal limitation] have concluded, in effect, 
that minor violations of the Terry temporal limitation may simply be ignored.” 
(footnote omitted)). Indeed, “[t]he fact of the matter is that many federal and 
state courts had massaged the temporal limitation so that police were given 
additional time to pursue investigations of matters other than the traffic vio-
lation. That Rodriguez hopefully closed down that operation is important.” E-
mail from Wayne R. LaFave, Professor Emeritus, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, to 
author (July 24, 2015, 12:53 EDT) (on file with author). 
 100. 543 U.S. at 405. 
 101. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009). 
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roadside detention.102 During routine traffic stops, dog sniffs 
and police questioning are aimed at detecting criminal con-
duct103 and as Justice Ginsburg conceded, have no nexus to the 
traffic stop. The traffic stop, in other words, provides the pre-
text for a criminal investigation. Justice Alito’s dissent in Ro-
driguez recognized this; indeed, Justice Alito welcomed the ma-
jority’s approval of police interrogation during traffic stops. 
After asserting that the Court “reaffirmed” that police may un-
dertake certain unrelated investigative steps during traffic 
stops, Justice Alito remarked that “it remains true that police 
may ask questions aimed at uncovering other criminal conduct 
and may order occupants out of their car during a valid stop,” 
without acknowledging the proviso that questioning not add 
time to the stop.104 
As I explain below, Justice Ginsburg’s approving comments 
regarding Caballes and Johnson take dicta from those cases to 
endorse arbitrary police conduct. Caballes and Johnson were 
self-described as narrow holdings that did not apply or address 
Terry’s scope prong. More importantly, police interrogation 
about matters unrelated to the traffic stop violates Terry’s 
scope prong. Arguably, police questioning (and dog sniffs) unre-
lated to the purpose of a traffic stop can be performed within 
the limits of Rodriguez’s holding; in the future, officers will no 
doubt attempt to sequence their “itinerary” questions (and dog 
sniffs) before the conclusion of the traffic stop.105 But as Justice 
 
 102. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (“[I]n 
Caballes and Johnson . . . . we concluded that the Fourth Amendment tolerat-
ed certain unrelated investigations that did not lengthen the roadside deten-
tion.”). 
 103. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s Death 
on the Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 572–73 (1998) (“Police officers 
can use the dogs either to handle searches when there is a refusal, or to short 
circuit the whole process by using the dog as soon as the car is stopped, with-
out even seeking consent. Once the dog indicates the presence of narcotics by 
characteristic barking or scratching, that information itself constitutes proba-
ble cause for a full-scale search. This activity constitutes a picture not of traffic 
enforcement but of drug interdiction. That is obviously what all of this is 
about; police use traffic infractions as excuses to initiate these encounters, and 
the Court’s cases concerning automobiles and their drivers provide the legal 
underpinnings for wide-ranging searches . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 104. Rodriguez, 132 S. Ct. at 1625 n.2 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 105. Justice Alito appears to encourage as much regarding dog sniffs. See 
id. at 1625 (“The rule that the Court adopts will do little good going forward. It 
is unlikely to have any appreciable effect on the length of future traffic stops. 
Most officers will learn the prescribed sequence of events even if they cannot 
fathom the reason for that requirement.” (footnote omitted)). Justice Alito’s 
subtle advice to officers on how to avoid the impact of Rodriguez during future 
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Ginsburg’s dissent in Caballes demonstrated, police deploy-
ment of a drug-sniffing canine cannot be reconciled with the 
Terry test.106 If using a drug-sniffing dog is inconsistent with 
Terry’s scope prong, police interrogation would seem to be a for-
tiori inconsistent with the scope prong; such conduct is inevita-
bly longer and more personally intrusive than the typical ca-
nine sniff. Also, by approving police interrogation unrelated to 
the traffic stop, so long as such questioning does not prolong 
the stop, Justice Ginsburg has endorsed a rule that lacks 
standards and will be difficult for judges to enforce.  
Paradoxically, in the same opinion that strikes down an 
unconstitutional police investigative technique, the Rodriguez 
Court provides a “green light” for another unconstitutional in-
vestigative technique. If the Court intended to limit the discre-
tionary power of police during traffic stops, it failed. “[D]rug-
sniffing dogs are brought around [by police] on occasion, but of-
ficers ask questions outside the scope of the traffic [violation] 
all the time.”107 The remainder of this Part explains why 
Caballes and Johnson do not support police questioning during 
 
traffic stops is unpersuasive. In his analysis of Rodriguez, Professor LaFave 
recognizes that there may be future cases not directly controlled by Rodri-
guez’s holding. For example:  
(i) [T]he officer, needing only three more minutes to complete the 
‘mission’ by writing up the warning ticket, instead delays that step 
while awaiting backup and putting his dog through his paces, taking 
eight minutes, resulting in the discovery of drugs and arrest of the 
driver at that point; and (ii) the officer instead uses the eight minutes 
at the very outset of the traffic stop, so that the discovery of drugs 
and arrest (terminating the traffic stop) occur at that early point. 
4 LAFAVE, supra note 9999, § 9.3(b), at 47 (Supp. 2015). However, if Rodri-
guez’s explanation that the “critical question . . . is not whether the dog sniff 
occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, . . . but whether conducting 
the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop,’” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 
1616 (citations omitted), then Rodriguez’s holding should cover both hypothet-
icals. A contrary result would give officers engaged in pretextual traffic stops 
“the benefit of a no-lose situation,” and “Rodriguez would stand alone as the 
only Supreme Court decision in which the Fourth Amendment status of a po-
lice investigative technique can be determined only with the benefit of hind-
sight.” 4 LAFAVE, supra note 9999, § 9.3(b), at 47–48 (Supp. 2015). 
 106. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 421 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“Injecting [a drug-detection dog] into a routine traffic stop changes the char-
acter of the encounter between the police and the motorist. The stop becomes 
broader, more adversarial, and (in at least some cases) longer.”). Tellingly, 
Justice Ginsburg observed: “The question whether a police officer inquiring 
about drugs without reasonable suspicion unconstitutionally broadens a traffic 
investigation is not before the Court.” Id. at 421 n.3. 
 107. Kerr, supra note 67. 
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routine traffic stops and why a “no prolongation” standard will 
not check the discretionary power of police during traffic stops. 
A. ILLINOIS V. CABALLES 
Professor Wayne LaFave has described Caballes as a “puz-
zling decision.”108 
An Illinois State Trooper stopped Roy Caballes’s vehicle for 
driving seventy-one miles-per-hour on an interstate road with a 
sixty-five miles-per-hour limit.109 Although his assistance was 
not requested, a second trooper with a drug-detection dog came 
to the scene.110 The second trooper walked the dog around 
Caballes’s vehicle while Caballes was sitting in the patrol car of 
the first trooper awaiting the issuance of a warning ticket.111 
The dog alerted and a search of the trunk revealed marijua-
na.112 The Illinois Supreme Court, relying on the two-prong Ter-
ry test, found no basis for suspecting that Caballes was trans-
porting drugs and thus ruled that the dog sniff “unjustifiably 
enlarge[d] the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investi-
gation.”113  
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion described the issue in 
Caballes as “narrow: ‘Whether the Fourth Amendment requires 
reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-
detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic 
stop.’”114 The Caballes Court ruled that individualized suspicion 
of wrongdoing is not required to justify using a drug-sniffing 
canine. The sum and substance of the Court’s reasoning is cap-
tured in the following sentence: “In our view, conducting a dog 
sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is 
lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable 
 
 108. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(b), at 485–86. 
 109. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Ill. 2003). 
 110. Id.  
 111. See id. (stating that while in the patrol car, the trooper asked Caballes 
“where he was going and why he was ‘dressed up’”; after confirming that 
Caballes’s license was valid, the officer requested a criminal history check, 
“then asked [Caballes] for permission to search his vehicle” and “asked 
[Caballes] if he had ever been arrested”). From the record it appears that only 
after receiving the results of Caballes’s criminal history check did the officer 
begin to write a warning ticket. Id. 
 112. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005). 
 113. Id. at 407 (quoting Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 205). 
 114. Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 
(No. 03-923)). 
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manner, unless the dog sniff itself infringed [Caballes’s] consti-
tutionally protected interest in privacy.”115 
Although many judges have read Caballes as granting 
nearly carte blanche authority to utilize a dog sniff during a 
traffic stop,116 the passage from Caballes quoted above is a thin 
reed to support that conclusion, and most importantly, it does 
not address the holding and reasoning of the Illinois Supreme 
Court. As Professor LaFave explains, the decision below “was 
grounded in the straightforward proposition that the temporal 
and scope limitations adopted in Terry and its progeny are 
equally applicable to traffic stops.”117 Moreover, the Caballes 
Court’s willingness to “accept the state court’s conclusion that 
the duration of the stop in this case was entirely justified by 
the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a 
stop”118 utterly fails to address whether employing the dog was 
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justi-
fied the [traffic stop] in the first place.”119 Concededly, that a se-
cond officer immediately came to the scene and deployed the 
 
 115. Id. at 408.  
 116. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1619 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Caballes expressly anticipated that a traffic stop 
could be reasonably prolonged for officers to engage in a dog sniff.”). Justice 
Thomas went on to explain that Caballes drew the “dividing line” between le-
gal and illegal stops based on “whether the overall duration of the stop exceed-
ed ‘the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission,’” and not on 
whether the length of the stop exceeded the time needed to complete traffic-
related questioning. Id. (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407). The lower courts 
have also read Caballes broadly. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 511 F. 
App’x 424, 427 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has stated categorically 
that the use of dogs during routine traffic stops does not infringe on one’s con-
stitutionally protected privacy interests.” (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409)); 
United States v. Walker, 719 F. Supp. 2d 586, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“There is 
nothing remarkable about a canine sniff of the exterior of a vehicle during a 
traffic stop even absent reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains contra-
band.” (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409)).  
 117. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(b), at 487. 
 118. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. As one commentator has noted, the basis 
and meaning of this statement is unclear “given that none of the state courts 
made such a holding explicitly, and the Illinois Supreme Court never so much 
as intimated that conclusion.” Harold J. Krent, The Continuity Principle, Ad-
ministrative Constraint, and the Fourth Amendment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
53, 81 (2005). Moreover, Justice Stevens’s opinion never explains why the 
trooper’s interrogation of Caballes regarding his attire, running of a criminal 
history check, asking for permission to perform a consent search and inquiring 
whether Caballes had ever been arrested, “w[ere] entirely justified by the traf-
fic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop.” Caballes, 543 
U.S. at 408; see supra notes 111–155 and accompanying text. 
 119. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). 
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dog before the first officer finished writing the warning ticket 
explains why there may have been no prolongation of the de-
tention. But that determination does not end the constitutional 
inquiry. As Justice Ginsburg correctly observed in her Caballes 
dissent, “[i]t is hardly dispositive that the dog sniff . . . may not 
have lengthened the duration of the stop.”120 As the discussion 
above in Part I revealed, Terry and its progeny mandate con-
sideration of both the length and scope of an investigative de-
tention.  
The scope prong of the Terry test was violated in Caballes 
because using the dog, without individualized suspicion of crim-
inality or consent of the driver, broadened the incident “from a 
routine traffic stop to a drug investigation.”121 Why? Deploying 
a dog during an ordinary traffic stop “changes the character of 
the encounter between the police and the motorist. The stop be-
comes broader, more adversarial, and (in at least some cases) 
longer.”122 The motorist understands that he has been targeted 
by the police; it is “an accusatory act” that is likely to be “upset-
ting to the innocent motorist because it will appear that he has 
been singled out as a drug suspect for reasons about which he 
 
 120. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 420 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 421. 
 122. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 126–32 (4th Cir. 
2010) (describing search in which the detaining officer issued a warning ticket 
for excessively tinted windows, then after being refused consent to search the 
vehicle, the officer “informed Mason that he believed that there were drugs in 
the car and that he was going to have a dog sniff the car”; another officer on 
scene performed a dog sniff about five minutes later and the court upheld the 
sniff as a de minimis delay supported by reasonable suspicion); United States 
v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 752 (6th Cir. 2008) (ruling a dog sniff violated the 
Fourth Amendment because it “extended the scope and duration of the stop 
beyond that necessary to issue a citation for a tag-light violation”); United 
States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1217–21 (11th Cir. 1999) (describing stop in 
which, upon being denied consent to search, the detaining officer “picked up 
his police radio to declare that, ‘I have a refusal’—a code phrase indicating to 
the other officers that they should bring a drug-sniffing dog to the scene”; then 
the dog took “more than fifteen minutes” to arrive and the court invalidated 
the sniff as an unreasonable prolongation beyond the scope of a speeding vio-
lation); United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 944 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[A]fter 
having failed to obtain voluntary consent to search, [the officer] told Mr. Wood 
that he was detaining the car and its contents in order to subject it to a canine 
sniff.”); United States v. Santillian, No. 13 Cr. 138(RWS), 2013 WL 4017167, 
at *4–8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013) (describing a traffic stop lasting one hour and 
seventeen minutes that included forty minutes spent waiting for a dog to ar-
rive on the scene; the court ruled the sniff was valid because the motorist 
granted officers permission to search the vehicle, and the forty minutes spent 
waiting was simply deemed a consequence of granting that permission).  
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can only speculate.”123 The fact that the dog sniff did not 
amount to a “search” or additional “seizure” under the Fourth 
Amendment is legally irrelevant.124 It was enough that the dog 
sniff did not promote the purpose of the traffic stop; “that alone 
establishes a scope violation.”125 Put simply, the dog sniff had 
no nexus to Caballes’s speeding violation; it was, to paraphrase 
Rodriguez, solely aimed at discovering criminality.126 
It is an understatement to say that the reasoning and re-
sult in Caballes were disappointing. Professor LaFave, the 
greatest scholar on the Fourth Amendment in American history 
and someone not prone to hyperbolic language,127 described the 
Caballes opinion as abrupt and without legal analysis.128 One 
could interpret Caballes as ruling that only activity that 
 
 123. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(f), at 546. 
 124. The fact that neither a dog sniff nor police questioning constitute a 
search or seizure does not change the application of Terry’s scope prong. While 
one might argue that because neither a dog sniff nor police questioning trig-
gers Fourth Amendment safeguards, a motorist has no constitutionally-
protected interest against this type of police conduct. That position, however, 
ignores the constitutional rule that even a lawful intrusion can be unreasona-
bly exacerbated by police conduct that may not be either a search or seizure 
and does not prolong a legitimate police seizure, but is nonetheless unrelated 
or unnecessary to the accomplishment of the lawful intrusion.  
For example, in Wilson v. Layne, while executing an arrest warrant in a 
private home, police invited members of the press to accompany them. 526 
U.S. 603, 607 (1999). The Court ruled that this action violated the Fourth 
Amendment because “the presence of the reporters inside the home was not 
related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion.” Id. at 611. The result in 
Wilson did not turn on a finding that the presence of reporters constituted a 
separate search or seizure apart from the initial intrusion. Id. at 614. The log-
ic of Wilson shows that the absence of a separate search or seizure does not 
mean that arbitrary interrogation of a detained motorist is without constitu-
tional significance. 
 125. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(b), at 489. 
 126. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (“A dog sniff 
. . . is a measure aimed at ‘detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdo-
ing.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); see also 4 LAFAVE, supra note 
99, § 9.3(f), at 545 (“[T]he question is not whether any of the drug-seeking tac-
tics are themselves Fourth Amendment searches, for the point is that they 
taint the stop purportedly made only for a traffic violation because they have 
absolutely no relationship to traffic law enforcement.”). 
 127. See Jerold H. Israel & Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave: Search & Sei-
zure Commentator at Work and Play, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 189 (stating 
that “it would be fair to say nobody in American history has done more [or bet-
ter]” writing and analysis of search and seizure doctrine than Professor 
LaFave). 
 128. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(b), at 488 (“The abruptness of the 
Court’s decision and the virtually total lack of analysis might appear even to 
raise some doubt as to what the basis of the decision actually is.”). 
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amounts to a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment 
triggers Terry’s scope prong. But Justice Stevens never makes 
that assertion. Further, it is baffling that Caballes, in reversing 
the Illinois Supreme Court ruling “never even cited Terry or 
any of [Terry’s progeny] discussing [the temporal and scope] 
limitations, and, for that matter, never cited any prior Supreme 
Court decision at all to justify its holding!”129  
In light of Justice Stevens’s lack of legal analysis, a judge 
might read Caballes as requiring judicial attention only to the 
length of a traffic stop. Careful consideration of Caballes, how-
ever, demonstrates why that interpretation should be rejected. 
Indeed, there are several reasons why Caballes should not be 
viewed as announcing a constitutional rule that considers only 
the duration of a traffic stop, or as eliminating judicial exami-
nation of police conduct unrelated to the purpose of the stop. 
Such an interpretation conflicts with Terry, which emphasized 
that “[t]he manner in which the seizure and search were con-
ducted is, of course, as vital a part of the inquiry as whether 
they were warranted at all.”130 Put simply, it is wrong to read 
Caballes as standing for the view that the scope prong of Terry 
means duration and nothing more. That view not only requires 
ignoring four decades’ worth of cases relying on the two-prong 
Terry test, but also requires ignoring the text of Justice Ste-
vens’s opinion. Justice Stevens plainly states that a valid traffic 
stop “can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execu-
tion unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitu-
tion.”131 This language instructs judges to examine the scope 
and intrusiveness of the police conduct. In the very next sen-
tence, Justice Stevens then focuses on temporal concerns. He 
asserts that a stop “can become unlawful if it is prolonged be-
yond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.”132 
Thus, when one considers: (1) the fact that Caballes never cites 
Terry, let alone hints at overruling the decades-old two-prong 
Terry test; (2) other language in Caballes consistent with the 
Terry test’s scope prong; (3) the lack of an explanation on why 
the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court, which applied the 
scope prong consistently with the Court’s prior precedents, is 
wrong; and (4) the fact that Justice Stevens characterized the 
issue before the Court as “narrow,” it makes no sense to inter-
 
 129. Id. at 487. 
 130. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968). 
 131. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 132. Id. (emphasis added). 
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pret Caballes as restricting the scope inquiry to duration and 
nothing else.133 
If the above analysis is correct, how, then, should one in-
terpret Caballes? The holding in Caballes should be confined to 
the narrow proposition that a dog sniff is not a “search” within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Stevens devot-
ed much of his opinion to explaining that precedents estab-
lished that “[police] conduct that does not ‘compromise any le-
gitimate interest in privacy’ is not a search subject to the 
Fourth Amendment.”134 In his brief, counsel for Caballes sought 
to distinguish those precedents from the dog sniff at issue in 
Caballes.135 That effort did not persuade a majority of the Jus-
 
 133. Finally, unless his views had changed by the time he authored 
Caballes, Justice Stevens’s dissent in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996), 
shows that he believes that Terry’s scope prong does apply to police question-
ing during ordinary traffic stops. In Robinette, Justice Stevens cited Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 
(1975), for the constitutional principles that investigative seizures must be 
temporary and last no longer than necessary to satisfy the purpose of the stop, 
and that an officer’s inquiries during an investigative stop must be reasonably 
related in scope to the justification for the stop. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 50 n.8 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Eight years later, in another dissent, Justice Stevens 
cited Terry for the rule that “an officer’s inquiry [of someone being detained] 
‘must be “reasonably related in scope to the justification for [the stop’s] initia-
tion.”’” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 193 (2004) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 134. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 
109, 123 (1984)). 
 135. Counsel argued that United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), 
should not be read as holding a general principle that dog sniffs are not 
searches. Brief for Respondent at 13, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (No. 03-923). He 
contended that Place was a “careful contextual” ruling limited to situations 
where law enforcement had reasonable suspicion that a person’s luggage 
might contain illegal narcotics. Id. Moreover, counsel for Caballes contended 
that City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), which in the course of 
invalidating a narcotics roadblock acknowledged that a dog sniff was not a 
search under the Fourth Amendment, “had no occasion to decide what sort of 
Fourth Amendment justification might be necessary for a drug sniff under any 
other circumstances.” Brief for Respondent, supra, at 11. And counsel tried to 
limit United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (concluding that, relying 
on Place, a chemical field test of white powder, which only revealed whether 
the powder was contraband or not, was not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment), to the specific case where a chemical field test “could reveal 
nothing about noncontraband items.” Brief for Respondent, supra, at 12 (cita-
tion omitted). In sum, counsel argued that the Court’s prior rulings could not 
“fairly be read as having removed dog sniffs from the ambit of the Fourth 
Amendment altogether.” Id. at 13. At oral argument, counsel did not get the 
chance to argue that use of the dog exceeded the scope prong of Terry. He was, 
however, vigorously questioned about the Court’s prior dog sniff rulings, and 
was directly asked by Justice O’Connor, the author of Place and Edmond, if he 
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tices.136 Justice Stevens’s majority opinion reaffirmed those 
precedents and concluded that their reasoning was applicable 
to the context of routine traffic stops. Therefore, the Court in 
Caballes concluded that “[a] dog sniff conducted during a con-
cededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other 
than the location of a substance that no individual has any 
right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”137 
This was a reaffirmation of the Court’s first canine-sniffing 
case, United States v. Place,138 where the Court described a dog 
sniff as a sui generis investigative tactic because, inter alia, it 
“discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contra-
band item,”139 and therefore is immune from constitutional 
scrutiny. Caballes is best viewed as following the rule an-
nounced in Place and nothing more. 
B. MUEHLER V. MENA AND ARIZONA V. JOHNSON 
Police typically question motorists about topics beyond the 
scope of a traffic stop for two reasons: they are seeking consent 
to search the vehicle or they are trying to develop reasonable 
suspicion of criminal conduct, which would justify more intru-
sive detention and investigative methods.140 Either way, the 
 
was asking the Court to overrule those precedents. Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 31, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (No. 03-923). He replied that he was not 
asking that Place be overruled. Id. 
 136. Justice Souter’s dissent, by contrast, concluded that “using the dog for 
the purposes of determining the presence of marijuana in the car’s trunk was 
a search unauthorized as an incident of the speeding stop and unjustified on 
any other ground.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 405 (majority opinion). 
 138. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). The Court relied upon Place in Edmond, 531 U.S. 
at 40, another dog sniff case, and in Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123, a case involv-
ing a chemical field test that only revealed whether a substance was cocaine. 
 139. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
 140. See, e.g., GARY WEBB, CAL. STATE ASSEMBLY TASK FORCE ON GOV’T 
OVERSIGHT, OPERATION PIPELINE: CALIFORNIA JOINT LEGISLATIVE TASK 
FORCE REPORT (Sept. 29, 1999), https://web.archive.org/web/20060831023209/ 
http://www.aclunc.org/discrimination/webb-report.html (“[California Highway 
Patrol (CHP]) reports make clear that [Operation] Pipeline units exist for one 
reason only—narcotics interdiction—and that traffic safety, which is the pri-
mary function of the [CHP], is only a minor part of their jobs. . . . Pipeline 
teams are able to pull over a great many cars to find drivers who fit estab-
lished ‘profiles’ of what drug couriers are supposed to look and act like. Once a 
profile fits, then the officer’s goal becomes to search the car and the occu-
pants.”); LaFave, supra note 822, at 1885–86 (explaining that police “question-
ing is sometimes profitable; the interrogatee may actually admit to the posses-
sion of drugs, or his staunch denial may produce what is deemed consent to a 
search when the officer responds that then the driver will not mind if the of-
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point of the questioning is to investigate crime and has nothing 
to do with the traffic stop. When this type of interrogation pro-
duces criminal evidence and is later challenged, courts general-
ly concluded, before Rodriguez, that such questioning does not 
infringe the Fourth Amendment because it does not unduly 
prolong the traffic stop, or it merely constitutes a minor intru-
sion after the traffic stop should have concluded.141 When judg-
es consider itinerary questioning as a trivial inconvenience, 
they have their heads in judicial sand. Consider one description 
of such questioning: 
The officer is trained to subtly ask [motorists] questions about their 
registration papers, their destination, their itinerary, the purpose of 
their visit, the names and addresses of whomever they are going to 
see, etc. Officers are trained to make this conversation appear [as] a 
natural and routine part of the collection of information incident to a 
citation or warning. They are advised to interrogate the passengers 
separately, so their stories can be compared. The officer will apply 
more “indicators” at this point, including how long it took them to an-
swer the questions, how they acted, how consistent their stories were 
and what kind of eye contact they made.  
. . . . 
[In] approximately 30 hours of [actual] videotaped stops . . . [t]he 
questioning that was done was intense, very invasive and extremely 
protracted. It was not uncommon to see travelers spending 30 
minutes or more standing on the side of the road, fielding repeated 
questions about their family members, their occupations, their mari-
tal status, their immigration status, their criminal histories and their 
recreational use of drugs and alcohol. . . .  
  During the training session[s] . . . officers were advised to take the 
motorist’s pulse during the interrogation, to see if the motorist’s heart 
[was] beating rapidly. During the videotaped . . . stops, the officer was 
repeatedly seen taking motorists’ pulse, pronouncing them “way up 
there,” and then demanding to know why the motorist was so nerv-
ous. Pulse-taking was also used in conjunction with questions regard-
ing the motorist’s possible use of intoxicating drugs, particularly 
methamphetamines, and a high pulse rate was cited on several occa-
sions as the officer’s reasons for requiring a field sobriety test.142 
 
ficer looks in the vehicle.” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)). 
 141. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(d), at 528 (citations omitted). 
 142. WEBB, supra note 140. Consider also this explanation of a Utah state 
trooper’s description of traffic stop questioning:  
[T]he officer will ask you a series of questions about your travel plans. 
He’ll be friendly and polite: Where are you heading? How long will 
you be there? He’ll ask what you do for a living, or something equally 
innocuous. [He’ll say:] ‘And when I’m doing this, you know, I’m not 
sitting there grilling you,’ . . . . ‘I’m doing it in a way that you probably 
don’t even realize what I’m doing.’ What he’s doing is called an inter-
rogation, and your responses are being watched very closely. Did you 
have to think before answering? Did you repeat his questions? Are 
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When upholding this type of questioning, it comes as no 
surprise that “typically no explanation is offered as to why it is 
proper to hold someone longer than would otherwise be re-
quired because some of the time was taken up questioning the 
driver about matters totally unrelated to the traffic stop.”143 I 
agree with Professor LaFave that these results “are dead 
wrong!”144 They are wrong because such questioning fails the 
scope prong of the Terry test.145  
After Caballes and prior to the announcement of Mena146 
the federal courts of appeals were divided over whether police 
questioning unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop was con-
stitutional.147 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the existence of a 
split by noting that some federal circuits had ruled that police 
could not question motorists about drugs or guns without rea-
sonable suspicion that such items were in the car, while other 
circuit courts permitted officers to “subject motorists to some 
degree of unrelated questioning as a matter of course.”148 The 
Sixth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court resolved this 
 
you being too helpful, too cooperative, or too talkative? Those are all 
bad signs, as bad as monosyllabic answers. If you have a passenger, 
the passenger will be taken off to the side and interrogated separate-
ly. The officer will check to see if your stories match. 
Gary Webb, Driving While Black, ESQUIRE, Apr. 1999, at 125. 
 143. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(d), at 528–29.  
 144. Id. at 529. 
 145. Id. (“Rather, what should be the correct rule is that followed by some 
other courts, is that in strict accordance with Terry and its progeny, question-
ing during a traffic stop must be limited to the purpose of the traffic stop and 
thus may not be extended to the subject of drugs.”). In a 2004 law review arti-
cle, Professor LaFave argued that judicial rulings allowing unrelated police 
questioning during traffic stops  
are totally at odds with the Terry line of Supreme Court decisions on 
the limits applicable to temporary detentions, and amount to nothing 
more than an encouragement to police to engage in pretextual traffic 
stops so that they may engage in interrogation about drugs in a cus-
todial setting (albeit not custodial enough to bring even the protec-
tions of Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] into play). 
LaFave, supra note 82, at 1887 (footnote omitted). 
 146. 544 U.S. 93 (2005). 
 147. See Amy L. Vazquez, “Do You Have Any Drugs, Weapons, or Dead 
Bodies in Your Car?” What Questions Can a Police Officer Ask During a Traffic 
Stop?, 76 TUL. L. REV. 211, 223 (2001) (noting the disagreement among the 
federal circuit courts at the time: a minority of courts held that police “may 
ask any question, and there will not be a Fourth Amendment violation unless 
the questioning unreasonably extends the duration of the traffic stop,” while 
the majority of federal circuit courts had ruled that police “cannot expand the 
scope of questioning beyond any reasonable or articulate suspicion” (footnotes 
omitted)).  
 148. United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 489 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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split in Mena and “gave its imprimatur to wide-ranging ques-
tioning during a police detention.”149 
Since Mena, lower courts have continued to allow unrelat-
ed police interrogation, and they now rely upon Mena and 
Johnson150 for support.151 After Justice Ginsburg’s comments 
approving police interrogation in Rodriguez, future courts will 
have little reason to address the constitutionality of police in-
terrogation on topics outside the scope of a traffic stop, provided 
the questioning does not “measurably extend the duration of 
the stop”152 or “add[] time”153 to the stop. The rest of this Section 
explains why Mena and Johnson do not support this result. 
Mena is a curious precedent to support police interrogation 
about subjects beyond the scope of a traffic stop. First, Mena 
did not involve a traffic stop. It was a Section 1983 civil rights 
case. Iris Mena claimed, inter alia, that police violated her 
Fourth Amendment rights by questioning her about her immi-
gration status while she was being detained inside her home 
when the police were executing a search warrant for weapons 
and evidence of gang membership.154 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion rejected this claim because the Court’s prece-
dents had established that mere police questioning does not 
constitute a seizure.155 The precedents the Chief Justice was re-
ferring to involved police-citizen encounters that the Court 
deemed consensual or potentially consensual.156 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist also relied upon Caballes and explained that be-
cause Mena’s detention was not prolonged by the interrogation, 
 
 149. Id. The Sixth Circuit conceded that Mena was not a traffic stop case, 
but concluded that its reasoning logically applied “and the federal courts of 
appeals readily extended its holding to the traffic-stop context.” Id. at 490. 
 150. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009). 
 151. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(b), at 530 n.267 (citing cases). 
 152. Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333 (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93,  
100–01 (2005)). 
 153. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015).  
 154. Mena, 544 U.S. at 95–96. 
 155. Id. at 101 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); INS v. 
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984)). 
 156. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437–38 (remanding and directing lower court 
to determine, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether there was 
consent, and rejecting the defendant’s argument that there could not have 
been consent based on the information provided in the state court decision); 
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 221 (holding that the encounters at issue were consensu-
al). 
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there was no additional seizure, and thus no reason to require 
independent suspicion for the interrogation.157  
 Although Mena’s brief argued that the questioning violated 
the two-prong Terry standard,158 the premise of Mena’s hold-
ing—police interrogation does not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment—should not be reflexively extended to the very dif-
ferent context of a traffic stop. Why? Because Mena certainly 
did not address, let alone hold, that Terry’s scope prong applies 
to duration and nothing else. Furthermore, the investigative 
detention at issue in Mena was very different from the typical 
traffic stop. To be sure, police exercise some discretion when ef-
fectuating the type of detention at issue in Mena. However, the 
authority granting police access to the premises in a case like 
Mena—a judicial warrant—is conferred by a neutral official 
who has found probable cause that the home contains evidence 
of a crime or persons suspected of criminal conduct. Moreover, 
that judicial warrant is designed to focus and narrow the scope 
of objects sought by the police. Accordingly, the Court has con-
cluded that the existence of a warrant “provides an objective 
justification for the detention.”159 Put differently, a judicial war-
rant impliedly supports the conclusion that police have reason-
able suspicion to connect occupants of the premises to the crim-
inal activity they are investigating. 
By contrast, when police question motorists on topics unre-
lated to a traffic stop, they are on a fishing expedition without 
objective evidence of criminal conduct. “One of the truisms of 
American life is that the police may, if they want, stop just 
about any car that is driving down the highway.”160 Even police 
acknowledge their near-absolute authority to seize a motor-
 
 157. Mena, 544 U.S. at 101. 
 158. Brief for Respondent at 46–48, Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (No. 03-1423). Dur-
ing oral argument, Terry was mentioned only in passing and there was no dis-
cussion of Terry’s two-prong test. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–49, 
Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (No. 03-1423).  
 159. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703 (1981). 
 160. Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling 
and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 670 (2002); see 
also David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving 
While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 311–12 (1999) (“Since no one can 
drive for even a few blocks without committing a minor violation—speeding, 
failing to signal or make a complete stop, touching a lane or center line, or 
driving with a defective piece of vehicle equipment— . . . police officers can 
stop any driver, any time they are willing to follow the car for a short distance. 
In other words, police know that they can use the traffic code to their ad-
vantage, and they utilize it to stop vehicles for many nontraffic enforcement 
purposes.”). 
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ist.161 Not only do police have virtually unlimited power to stop 
cars, the initiation of the stop expands their discretionary op-
tions. Of course, officers decide whether to issue a ticket, issue 
a warning, or simply let the motorist go. But they also decide 
many other matters:  
On the one hand, police officers are not required to arrest suspects or 
to conduct searches when they have probable cause to do so, and fre-
quently they don’t. On the other hand, . . . even in the absence of 
probable cause, police officers have complete discretion to take many 
intrusive nonconsensual actions short of a full-blown “search.”162 
The point is that police have tremendous discretion during 
traffic stops; they possess more discretion than when seizing 
occupants of a home while executing a search warrant. For 
Fourth Amendment analysis, such discretionary power distin-
guishes a traffic stop from the investigative detention at issue 
in Mena.  
In sum, the detention in Mena was incident to a police 
power conferred by a neutral judge and did not involve the var-
ious discretionary decisions police make when conducting traf-
fic stops. Mechanically extending Mena to traffic stops, as 
many lower courts have done,163 ignores a fundamental point 
under Fourth Amendment analysis: “In perhaps no setting does 
law enforcement possess greater discretion than in the decision 
to conduct a traffic stop.”164 Thus, there is good reason for not 
extending Mena’s holding to the far different context of arbi-
trary questioning during a traffic stop. Further, there is no rea-
son to interpret Mena as confining Terry’s scope inquiry to 
temporal concerns. The best that can be said for applying 
 
 161. Gross & Barnes, supra note 160, at 671 (“As one California Highway 
Patrol Officer put it: ‘The vehicle code gives me fifteen hundred reasons to pull 
you over.’” (quoting Webb, supra note 1422, at 123)); Harris, supra note 103, at 
567–68 (“Witness these statements by police officers, which date back to the 
1960s: ‘You can always get a guy legitimately on a traffic violation if you tail 
him for a while, and then a search can be made.’ ‘You don’t have to follow a 
driver for very long before he will move to the other side of the yellow line and 
then you can arrest and search him for driving on the wrong side of the high-
way.’ ‘In the event that we see a suspicious automobile or occupant and wish 
to search the person or the car, or both, we will usually follow the vehicle until 
the driver makes a technical violation of a traffic law. Then we have a means 
of making a legitimate search.’”).  
 162. Gross & Barnes, supra note 160, at 675.  
 163. See, e.g., United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 490 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(“[T]he federal courts of appeals readily extended [Mena’s] holding to the traf-
fic-stop context.”). 
 164. Brooks Holland, Safeguarding Equal Protection Rights: The Search for 
an Exclusionary Rule Under the Equal Protection Clause, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1107, 1107 (2000). 
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Mena’s reasoning to the traffic stop context is that Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist’s opinion relied, in part, upon Caballes, an actu-
al traffic stop case. But given what has been said above about 
Caballes, Mena provides weak support for concluding that un-
related police interrogation is permissible during routine traffic 
stops, let alone concluding that the scope prong of Terry is sat-
isfied provided such questioning does not prolong the traffic 
stop. 
The police seizure in Johnson, in contrast to Mena, did 
begin as a traffic stop. At the end of a unanimous opinion writ-
ten by Justice Ginsburg, the Court stated: “An officer’s inquir-
ies into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic 
stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter 
into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those in-
quiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”165 
Johnson addressed the authority of police to frisk a passenger 
detained during a traffic stop. Lemon Montrea Johnson was a 
backseat passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for an insur-
ance-related traffic offense by several officers of a state gang 
task force.166 One officer ordered Johnson out of the vehicle and 
began questioning him about matters unrelated to the traffic 
infraction.167 Johnson’s behavior and answers lead the officer to 
suspect that Johnson might be armed. The officer frisked John-
son and discovered a weapon.168  
An Arizona appellate court ruled that the interaction be-
tween the officer and Johnson, which began as a seizure of 
Johnson, evolved into a consensual encounter immediately pri-
or to the frisk.169 According to the state court, absent reason to 
believe Johnson was involved in criminal activity, the officer 
lacked authority to frisk Johnson even if she had reason to be-
lieve that he might be armed and dangerous.170 The Supreme 
Court reversed this ruling and explained that Johnson re-
mained detained at the time of the frisk, and a frisk was per-
missible if the officer suspected that Johnson was armed and 
dangerous, even if she did not reasonably suspect that he was 
 
 165. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (citing Muehler v. Mena, 
544 U.S. 93, 100–01 (2005)). 
 166. Id. at 327. 
 167. Id. at 328. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 329. 
 170. Id. 
  
1974 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1939 
 
engaged in criminal activity immediately prior to the frisk.171 At 
the end of the opinion Justice Ginsburg wrote that the officer’s 
questions about matters unrelated to the traffic stop did not al-
ter the lawful status of the detention “so long as those inquiries 
d[id] not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”172  
It is plain that Johnson’s language about unrelated ques-
tioning is pure dictum. The holding in Johnson dealt with the 
authority of police to frisk someone subject to detention due to 
a traffic stop when the police suspect the person is armed and 
dangerous but lack suspicion to believe he or she has commit-
ted a specific crime. Unrelated questioning therefore has noth-
ing to do with the Court’s holding. Justice Ginsburg’s dictum is 
a bit surprising in light of the fact that Johnson’s brief only 
mentioned the questioning in passing, instead focusing on the 
lawfulness of the frisk.173 Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg made 
no effort to reconcile her dictum with the scope prong of the 
Terry test as it has been interpreted by the Court. True, just as 
the dog sniff in Caballes did not prolong the traffic stop, the of-
ficer’s interrogation did not prolong the seizure of Johnson until 
the weapon was found, but Terry requires judges to examine 
both the length and the manner of a seizure.174 As Justice Gins-
burg recognized in Caballes, “Terry, it merits repetition, in-
structs that any investigation must be ‘reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in 
the first place.’”175 Such examination was absent in Johnson.  
It is ironic, to say the least, that Justice Ginsburg would 
insert this dictum into her opinion in Johnson. After all, it was 
Justice Ginsburg who rightly recognized in Caballes that the 
Court had not yet answered the “question whether a police of-
ficer inquiring about drugs without reasonable suspicion un-
constitutionally broadens a traffic investigation.”176 That ques-
 
 171. Id. at 333–34. 
 172. Id. at 333 (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100–01 (2005)). 
 173. Following the lead of the court below, Johnson’s brief argued that the 
encounter between Johnson and the officer was consensual. Brief for Respond-
ent at 35–38, Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (No. 07-1122). The brief also argued that 
during a consensual encounter, two conditions are required to authorize a 
frisk: an officer may conduct a frisk if he is aware of facts “which lead him rea-
sonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be 
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and pres-
ently dangerous.” Id. at 15 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). 
 174. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 175. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 420 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). 
 176. Id. at 421 n.3. 
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tion was not resolved in Caballes, as evidenced by the federal 
circuit court split described earlier, nor was it addressed in 
Mena.177  
Again, it is constitutionally irrelevant that unrelated police 
questioning does not amount to a search or separate seizure. 
Indeed, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,178 the Court con-
fronted an analogous situation when it addressed the constitu-
tionality of drug roadblocks. At the challenged checkpoint, thir-
ty police officers stopped a predetermined number of vehicles.179 
An officer approached each vehicle and informed the motorist 
that he was being stopped briefly at a drug checkpoint. License 
and registration were requested and the officer looked for signs 
of impairment and conducted an “open-view examination of the 
vehicle from the outside.”180 A drug-detection dog was walked 
around the outside of each vehicle stopped at the checkpoint.181  
The Court in Edmond acknowledged that the dog sniff was 
not a search.182 That finding, however, did not prevent the 
Court from holding that the roadblock itself violated the Fourth 
Amendment.183 As conceded by the City, the “checkpoint pro-
gram unquestionably has the primary purpose of interdicting 
illegal narcotics.”184 That purpose distinguished the Indianapo-
lis roadblock from previous roadblocks upheld by the Court 
whose primary purposes were traffic enforcement or road safe-
ty.185 Ultimately, the Indianapolis checkpoint was unconstitu-
tional because its “primary purpose was to detect evidence of 
ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”186 Just as the roadblock in Ed-
mond was designed to detect illegal drugs, so too police ques-
tioning unrelated to a traffic stop is aimed at detecting ordi-
nary criminal conduct. Thus, it is constitutionally irrelevant in 
cases like Caballes and Johnson that a dog sniff or police ques-
tioning does not amount to a separate search or seizure. In-
 
 177. See supra text accompanying notes 146–64. 
 178. 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 179. Id. at 35. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 40. 
 183. Id. at 48. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (up-
holding roadblock aimed at detecting drunk driving); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (containing dictum noting the permissibility of roadblocks 
that question “all oncoming traffic” for safety and regulatory reasons). 
 186. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41. 
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stead, “the point is that they taint the stop purportedly made 
only for a traffic violation because they have absolutely no rela-
tionship to traffic law enforcement.”187 
C. ENFORCEABLE STANDARDS 
Mindful of the power of officers during traffic stops, Justice 
Kennedy once noted that “[t]raffic stops, even for minor viola-
tions, can take upwards of 30 minutes.”188 Justice Kennedy’s 
observation was offered in Maryland v. Wilson to highlight the 
“serious” consequences faced by a passenger who is ordered to 
exit a vehicle during a traffic stop.189 Justice Kennedy also 
acknowledged that when Whren v. United States,190 which ruled 
that police motives do not control the lawfulness of a traffic 
stop, is combined with Wilson’s holding, “the Court puts tens of 
millions of passengers at risk of arbitrary control by police.”191 
Justice Kennedy’s concerns about arbitrary police conduct 
are apropos to the context of unrelated police interrogation dur-
ing traffic stops. As Justice Kennedy has acknowledged, be-
cause traffic stops offer police myriad discretionary options, 
neutral principles are required to protect the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of motorists, which means the Justices must pro-
vide legal standards that check the discretionary authority of 
police during routine traffic stops.192 Interestingly, the Justices 
have a clear standard to determine whether police interroga-
tion during a traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment. Over 
forty years ago, Terry instructed judges to determine whether 
the police conduct was “reasonably related in scope to the cir-
cumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place.”193 By contrast, the standards employed by the Court to-
day are inadequate, vague and unenforceable.  
 
 187. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(f), at 545. 
 188. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 422 (1997) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing). 
 189. Id.  
 190. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 191. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 423 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 192. Cf. id. (“It does no disservice to police officers, however, to insist upon 
exercise of reasoned judgment. Adherence to neutral principles is the very 
premise of the rule of law the police themselves defend with such courage and 
dedication.”). 
 193. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). 
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For example, in Caballes, the Court stated that a “seizure 
that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning tick-
et to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond 
the time reasonably required to complete that mission.”194 In 
Johnson, the Court asserted that police inquiries “into matters 
unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not con-
vert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, 
so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the dura-
tion of the stop.”195 Arbitrary and discriminatory police interro-
gation during routine traffic stops will not be deterred by 
Fourth Amendment rules like the ones offered in Caballes and 
Johnson.196 
A “no prolongation” or “do not measurably extend” rule is a 
rule without standards. Implicit in such statements is the belief 
that the routine traffic stop has a fixed temporal limit, which 
police cannot exceed. Not surprisingly, neither the Court nor 
any lower court has articulated what that time limit is. In 
2000, a Maryland appellate court observed that there is no “set 
formula for measuring in the abstract what should be the rea-
sonable duration of a traffic stop.”197 Fifteen years later, no 
court or judge has offered a test for measuring the acceptable 
length of a routine traffic stop.198 During the oral argument in 
Rodriguez, Justice Breyer suggested the following rule: “It is 
the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop or it is 
the time that is reasonably required to complete the mission. 
We can’t do better than that. How can we?”199 Of course, this 
proposal does not help. If police questioning or dog-sniffing is 
deemed part of the “mission,” just as doing a license and regis-
tration check or requesting a criminal history report are con-
sidered part of the mission, then judges have no gauge to de-
termine whether a traffic stop has been unduly prolonged.200 
 
 194. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 195. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 196. Cf. LaFave, supra note 82, at 1867 (“In short, Fourth Amendment lim-
itations upon ‘routine traffic stops’ would be grossly inadequate if expressed 
solely in terms of the permissible duration of the stop.” (footnote omitted)). 
 197. Charity v. State, 753 A.2d 556, 566 (Md. 2000). 
 198. In a recent article, Professor Katz noted that “[s]ome state courts have 
held that processing an ordinary traffic stop should last only about fifteen 
minutes, which is probably the short end of that duration; other courts have 
indicated that a detention of twenty to twenty-five minutes during a traffic 
stop is reasonable.” Katz, supra note 50, at 1458 (footnotes omitted). 
 199. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. 
Ct. 1609 (2015) (No. 13-9972). 
 200. Consider the exchange between Justice Scalia and counsel for Rodri-
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Although the Court has not directly addressed the permissible 
duration of a traffic stop, the search for a serviceable and clear 
standard has not been advanced by the fact that the Court has 
twice rejected arguments to establish fixed time limits for in-
vestigative detentions involving Terry stops.201 If there is no 
discernible timeline beyond which a traffic stop may not ex-
tend, how will judges know when police have prolonged (or 
measurably extended) a traffic stop by arbitrarily interrogating 
motorists about topics unrelated to the stop? 
Another problem with a “no prolongation” rule was identi-
fied by the former Chief Justice of the California Supreme 
Court: 
This rule is unworkably vague. How is it possible to determine what 
amount of time would have been “reasonably necessary” for an officer 
to discharge the duties he or she had with respect to the traffic infrac-
tion itself? I submit, it is not possible. [A “no prolongation” or “do not 
measurably extend” rule] requires the officer and judge to determine 
 
guez during the oral argument of Rodriguez: 
JUSTICE SCALIA: [Y]ou apparently embrace the assumption, that 
checking on whether you have a . . . proper license, checking whether 
the car is stolen, all of these things are embraced within the mission 
when the only basis for the stop is you have a broken taillight. How 
does that have anything to do with the broken taillight? 
MR. O’CONNOR: Those are things, Your Honor, that have been ac-
cepted as part of—  
JUSTICE SCALIA: I see. 
MR. O’CONNOR: —the process. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, then maybe dog sniffing should be too, 
right? Dog sniffing is accepted, so long as it’s done before what? Be-
fore completion of—  
MR. O’CONNOR: Before the completion of the mission. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Which includes not just a broken taillight, but al-
so inquiring into your license, inquiring into prior arrests? That’s all 
part of the mission? 
MR. O’CONNOR: Yes, Your Honor, it is. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Why don’t you make the dog sniff part of the mis-
sion and that will solve the problem?  
. . . . 
MR. O’CONNOR: You expand the mission, Your Honor, for every-
thing that comes within the tasks that are part of the traffic stop. The 
dog sniff—  
JUSTICE SCALIA: It’s a broken taillight. That’s the only thing that 
comes within the traffic stop. All the rest is added on. 
Id. at 8–10. 
 201. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 n.10 (1983) (questioning the 
“wisdom of a rigid time limitation”); see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 
675, 686 (1985) (acknowledging Place’s unwillingness to adopt a per se time 
limit on investigative detentions and favorably quoting Place for the proposi-
tion that the Court will not adopt a “hard-and-fast” time limit for a valid Terry 
stop). 
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the duration of a past event which never occurred, i.e., the length of 
time the traffic detention would reasonably have required if the of-
ficer had not [subjected the motorist to a dog sniff or arbitrary ques-
tioning]. Not only must past history be thus reorganized, but a de-
termination must be made as to how many of the officer’s actions that 
never occurred would have been reasonably “necessary” to perform 
duties that may have been only partly performed.202 
And when judges attempt to identify other facts that signal 
the end of a traffic stop—for example, an officer’s issuance of a 
citation and return of a motorist’s driving documents—as a way 
to enforce a “no prolongation” rule, “[a] clever officer could al-
ways ward off the foreclosing effect of [such a rule] by deliber-
ately delaying his final termination of the traffic stop.”203 Final-
ly, because some forms of interrogation during traffic stops 
 
 202. State v. McGaughran, 601 P.2d 207, 216–17 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) 
(Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 203. Charity v. State, 753 A.2d 556, 566 (Md. 2000). The Justices recognize 
this issue as well; consider the following exchange between counsel for Rodri-
guez and some of the Justices: 
MR. O’CONNOR: As a policy question, if you could end [the traffic 
stop] with the handing of the ticket, that would be acceptable. If we 
tie—if we tie the traffic ticket as the end of the—end of the justifica-
tion for the stop, then we— 
JUSTICE ALITO: If we hold that it’s okay to have a dog sniff so long 
as it’s before the ticket is issued, then every police officer other than 
those who are uninformed or incompetent will delay the handing over 
of the ticket until the dog sniff is completed. So what has that—what 
does that accomplish? 
. . . . 
MR. O’CONNOR: What it accomplishes is the—is the enforcement of 
the Fourth Amendment. Once the stop is done, once the purpose is 
done, the justification is done, the person should be free to go. 
. . . . 
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, then the police can just say, I’m going to 
defer that a few minutes until the dog sniff occurs. It just seems that 
you’re not going to accomplish any protection for individuals if that’s 
your position, that—that it was just a question of when you do it. So if 
you do it during the stop, before the ticket issued, it’s okay and if you 
do it two minutes after, it’s not okay. 
MR. O’CONNOR: Your Honor, it is—it is okay when the traffic stop is 
done. When the mission is complete— 
JUSTICE SCALIA: You can’t possibly mean that. You can’t possibly 
mean that. 
MR. O’CONNOR: Oh, yes, sir, I do. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: The stopping officer says, I’m done, I got my tick-
et here. It’s all written out. However, before I give it to you, I want to 
have a dog sniff, I’m going to call in to headquarters. They’re going to 
send out a dog. It’s going to take maybe 45 minutes. You just sit there 
because the traffic stop is not—is not terminated until I give you your 
ticket. You’re going to allow that? 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–13, Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (No. 13-
9972).  
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entail a de minimis amount of time, and the opportunities to 
delay or extend the tasks associated with the traffic stop are 
ample, a “no prolongation” rule provides police unchecked dis-
cretion to question motorists about almost any topic whether 
related to the scope of the traffic stop or not.204 
When judges interpret Caballes, Mena, and Johnson as 
holding that “scope” means duration and nothing else, it is un-
derstandable why they have been unable to articulate a clear 
and workable rule. If the scope prong is confined to examining 
only the length of a stop, then no such rule exists. During the 
oral argument in Rodriguez, Justice Sotomayor pushed for 
what she considered to be a “simple rule”—“[I]f you’re going to 
do a stop, you can’t reasonably extend or pass the time it takes 
to deal with a ticket, correct?”205 I do not believe that this “sim-
ple” rule will work either, so long as police are permitted to do 
all the discretionary tasks that courts currently allow, such as 
checking on outstanding warrants, requesting criminal history 
reports, seeking consent to search a motorist’s vehicle, and 
questioning motorists about topics unrelated to the traffic 
stop.206 Concededly, the temporal restriction of the second prong 
of the Terry test does not exhibit bright-line qualities; that’s be-
cause “the permissible length of time can only be ascertained 
upon assessing the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case.”207 However, if judges desire clarity and guidance in this 
 
 204. See Salmeron v. State, 632 S.E.2d 645, 648 (Ga. 2006) (Sears, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 205. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2033, at 20. The Rodriguez 
majority seems to adopt Justice Sotomayor’s “simple rule” when it states: “Au-
thority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—
or reasonably should have been—completed.” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.  
 206. Although again unnecessary to its holding, the Rodriguez Court gave 
its imprimatur to criminal history and outstanding warrant checks when it 
noted that traffic stops are “‘especially fraught with danger to police officers,’ 
so an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in 
order to complete his mission safely.” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. The Court 
then cited to dicta from United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221–22 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (recognizing police safety reasons for criminal history and outstand-
ing warrant checks). Tellingly, in Holt the Tenth Circuit held that the gov-
ernment’s compelling interest in police and bystander safety justified asking a 
motorist about the presence of weapons in his vehicle after being stopped for a 
seatbelt violation. Id. at 1226; see also LaFave, supra note 82, at 1876–78 (not-
ing that lower courts have approved the general practice of conducting war-
rant checks during routine traffic stops); id. at 1880–81 (stating that most 
courts have found that a criminal history check is a valid part of a traffic stop, 
even for an innocuous traffic offense such as an unsignaled lane change).  
 207. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 9.3(b), at 506 (footnote omitted). 
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area, they will not find it in a “no prolongation” or “do not 
measurably extend the duration of the stop” standard.208  
Unfortunately, Justice Ginsburg’s refinement of these 
rules in Rodriguez fares no better than the original “no prolon-
gation” rule. Responding to the dissent’s claim that in future 
cases police will conduct dog sniffs before concluding a stop, 
Justice Ginsburg stated: “The critical question . . . is not 
whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a 
ticket, as Justice Alito supposes, but whether conducting the 
sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop.’”209 In the typical 
case where a motorist remains inside his vehicle, of course, po-
lice questioning about matters unrelated to the traffic stop (or 
conducting a dog sniff) will “add time” to the stop. How can an 
officer question a motorist about unrelated topics without add-
ing time to the stop? And if the officer wants to question a pas-
senger to look for inconsistencies with what the driver has al-
ready said, such questioning will “add time” to the stop. Justice 
Ginsburg points to Caballes and Johnson for support because 
the dog-sniff and questioning in those cases “did not lengthen” 
the stops.210 But the facts in Caballes and Johnson were atypi-
cal for a routine traffic stop. In Caballes, a second officer, who 
immediately came to the scene after hearing about the stop on 
his police-radio, performed the sniff procedure while Caballes 
sat in the stopping-officer’s patrol car awaiting the issuance of 
a warning ticket.211 In Johnson, three officers from an anti-gang 
unit stopped a vehicle with three occupants. Each officer dealt 
separately with an occupant, which allowed the officer ques-
tioning Johnson to conduct her interrogation while her col-
leagues questioned the remaining two occupants.212  
To be sure, if an officer interrogates a single motorist in-
side a patrol car while checking the motorist’s documents, or 
awaiting a criminal history or outstanding warrant check, brief 
questioning may not prolong the stop. But the cases indicate 
 
 208. Cf. id. § 9.3(f), at 544 (“There should be no need for the complex and 
often nearly impossible task of calculating just when the time should be 
deemed to have expired in the case of a particular traffic stop and, often, the 
equally bedeviling task of heading down the slippery slope to determine just 
how much extra time after the proper ending of the traffic stop should be ex-
cused on some de minimis theory.”).  
 209. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (citations omitted). 
 210. Id. at 1614. 
 211. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 212. See Johnson v. United States, 555 U.S. 323, 327–28 (2009). 
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that police interrogation is seldom brief.213 In fact, there is ob-
jective evidence to suggest that police interrogation, particular-
ly when performed by drug-interdiction officers who use traffic 
offenses as a pretext to conduct criminal investigations, is “in-
tense, very invasive and extremely protracted.”214 The most 
practical and clearest rule is the standard that was established 
in Terry: whether the police conduct was “reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in 
the first place.”215 When this rule is applied to police interroga-
 
 213. See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 684 F.3d 758, 761–62 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(describing a stop in which fifty-four minutes passed between the stop’s initia-
tion and a dog sniff, and during which time the officer asked all sorts of ques-
tions unrelated to “crossing the center line,” for example: where the driver was 
coming from, how long he had been there, what he thought of the hotel portion 
of the Hard Rock Casino, what floor of the hotel he had stayed on, and if he’d 
ever been in trouble before); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1514 
(10th Cir. 1998) (describing how the defendant and his wife were stopped be-
cause an officer suspected the defendant was not wearing a seat belt; after de-
termining that defendant was properly driving the vehicle, officer interrogated 
defendant about his destination, whether his wife was employed, when the 
couple were married, and whether they were carrying any large sums of mon-
ey); Maxwell v. State, 785 So. 2d 1277, 1279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (describ-
ing a case when a motorist was stopped for driving five miles per hour over the 
speed limit, after which the officer asked the motorist: “Do you have any drugs 
in the car? When was the last time you used marijuana? Have you ever been 
arrested for drugs? Has anyone been in your car recently with drugs? Do you 
object to a search of your car? Do you have any objection to the drug dog walk-
ing around your car? . . . Do you have any guns in your car? Have you had any 
firearms violations?” (footnotes omitted)). If the detained vehicle contains pas-
sengers, the passengers often are separated for individual questioning, after 
which officers compare their answers, prolonging the traffic stop further. See, 
e.g., United States v. Coney, 456 F.3d 850, 852–54 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining 
that when the officer detained a car containing three brothers, the driver was 
immediately taken into the squad car for questioning, then another brother 
was taken off to the side of the road to a ditch for questioning, leaving the 
third brother in the car alone for questioning).   
 214. WEBB, supra note 140. The report continues: 
Key to the program is the use of “verbal warnings” to pull over suspi-
cious-looking motorists in order to question and, if need be, search 
them. Verbal warnings are regarded by drug interdiction troopers as 
a tool of [the] trade, and by their superiors as a measure of the troop-
er’s productivity and aggressiveness in the search[] for drugs. Since 
Pipeline officers are not expected to write many traffic tickets, and oc-
casionally are discouraged from doing so, there can be no legitimate 
reason why they would stop and detain thousands of motorists simply 
to warn them against insignificant vehicle code infractions. There can 
be little doubt that verbal warnings have been used by CHP drug in-
terdiction teams as pretexts to investigate motorists for drug crimes. 
As a result, many motorists have been subjected to intense, invasive, 
and extremely protracted roadside interrogations. 
Id.   
 215. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). 
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tion unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop, the answer is 
clear—such questioning violates the Fourth Amendment be-
cause it has nothing to do with a routine traffic stop.  
  CONCLUSION   
In 1984, Berkemer v. McCarty216 addressed whether road-
side questioning of a motorist during a traffic stop requires the 
giving of Miranda warnings. The defense argued, inter alia, 
that unless warnings are provided, police “will simply delay 
formally arresting detained motorists, and will subject them to 
sustained and intimidating interrogation at the scene of their 
initial detention.”217 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice 
Marshall commented that the Court was “confident that the 
state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass.”218 
Well, thirty years later one can conclude that the Court was 
wrong; police routinely subject some motorists to persistent and 
intimidating interrogation unrelated to the purpose of a traffic 
stop. Although the questioning in McCarty was related to the 
reason for the stop, the law reports are full of cases demon-
strating that questioning about a motorist’s itinerary, drugs, or 
guns is arbitrary and done in the absence of individualized 
suspicion of criminality.  
Regrettably, the Court has never directly addressed 
whether police questioning unrelated to the purpose of a traffic 
stop is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The Court’s ne-
glect to confront this issue is unfortunate because the bulk of 
arbitrary police interrogation is borne by innocent motorists 
who will often allow police to search their vehicles due to fear 
or ignorance of their constitutional rights.219 It is sometimes 
 
 216. 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
 217. Id. at 440. 
 218. Id.  
 219. See Gross & Barnes, supra note 160, at 667, 672 (explaining that the 
results of an empirical study of highway stops by the Maryland State Police 
from January 1995 through June 2000 show that “[t]wo-thirds of the cars 
searched by the Maryland State Police carried no illegal drugs, or at least 
none were found,” and that “when consent was requested [by the Maryland 
State Police] consent was given, 96% of the time statewide and 97% of the time 
on [the northern portion of Interstate 95 from Baltimore to the Delaware bor-
der]”); see also, WEBB, supra note 140 (“While [Operation Pipeline] sometimes 
results in large drug or cash seizures, it also consumes hundreds of man-hours 
in fruitless and intimidating searches of motorists who, for the most part, are 
Latino and are guilty of nothing more than a minor traffic infraction, if that. 
The program also falls heavily upon tourists and vacationers. CHP routinely 
exploits differences in state motor vehicle laws regarding window tinting and 
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said that “the Fourth Amendment has become constitutional 
law for the guilty; that it benefits the career criminal (through 
the exclusionary rule) often and directly, but the ordinary citi-
zen remotely if at all.”220 If the Court wants to counter that per-
ception, it should abandon the dictum offered in Rodriguez and 
announce that arbitrary police interrogation during routine 
traffic stops is inconsistent with the central meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, which, as Professor Amsterdam’s article 
brilliantly teaches, was designed to restrain police discretion 
when conducting searches and seizures.  
 
 
license plates to stop out-of-state vehicles and interrogate the passengers.”). 
The California report specifically analyzed one trooper’s reports over the first 
nine months of 1998, which showed 1,264 verbal warnings issued, 163 search-
es, and only 18 finds, meaning “about 1% of all the stops he made” resulted in 
the discovery of contraband. Id. A report from the New Jersey Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office on traffic stops and consent searches conducted by New Jersey 
State Troopers on a section of the New Jersey Turnpike made similar findings. 
See STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM, N.J. ATTORNEY GEN., INTERIM REPORT RE-
GARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 36–37 (1999), http://www.state 
.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf (finding that in New Jersey, “most of the consent 
searches that we considered did not result in a positive finding, meaning that 
they failed to reveal evidence of a crime . . . major seizures of significant drug 
shipments are correspondingly rare”).  
 220. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
